CD/PV.674
10 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 674th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Republic of Korea, Norway, Argentina, Egypt, Brazil and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Before giving the floor to those inscribed to speak today, I should like on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to extent a cordial welcome to those representatives of the NGO community present today in the public gallery, who, in accordance with what has become a well-established tradition, will present to the Conference a message to commemorate International Women's Day. As you know, International Women's Day was celebrated on 8 March but, nevertheless, I should like to take this first available opportunity to extend our very best wishes to all the women present in the room today and say how much we appreciate their constant commitment to disarmament and peace. I wish now to give the floor to Ms. Jenifer Mackby of the secretariat to read out the message addressed to us on this occasion.

Ms. MACKBY (Secretariat): The message reads as follows:

"On the 8th day of March women all around the world celebrated International Women's Day. In commemorating women's lives, this day serves as a reminder of the strength and resilience women have shown in struggling for peace and justice. The issue of peace has always been of particular importance to women as they have been, and continue to be, adversely affected both by violence manifested overtly and in its structural forms. In this light, as the international women's community continues to prepare for the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing, our thoughts are concentrated on the conference's themes - equality, development and peace. We view disarmament as an essential condition for peace.

"Today we wish to convey to the Conference on Disarmament our hopes and our fears. We wish to express our support to you for your efforts in advancing the goal of arms limitation and disarmament. We hope your activities lead us toward a weapon-free world. We also fear that progress is too slow. As the world rapidly changes, opportunities can be both created and missed. We call on the Conference on Disarmament to take advantage of this period in history and rapidly advance its disarmament negotiations.

"Working for peace and disarmament, we have reflected on our preferred vision of the future in this post-cold-war era. We have envisioned not only what we want our world to look like, but also what our responsibilities to it entail. We reject a world order based on violence, force and coercion and instead embrace one where cooperation, community, and the meeting of human needs form the foundation of human interaction. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to undertake its work with this vision in mind.

"Disarmament is necessary to produce system-wide changes in the world's political, social, and economic conditions, and must involve the active participation of all States and their peoples. As non-governmental organizations, we take advantage of the possibility we have to observe the plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Today we ask you to consider the possibility of us observing the Ad Hoc Committees as well.

"In addressing you today, we wish to draw attention to several specific issues of importance to us:

"The comprehensive test-ban treaty. We congratulate you on beginning negotiation for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Women have led efforts promoting such negotiations for a very long time.

"We are hopeful that the work of this Committee will lead to a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty permanently prohibiting all nuclear-weapons testing. We call on those Governments currently adhering to a moratorium on testing to prolong the moratorium after July 1994 with other nuclear Powers following suit.

"On the issue of treaty verification and compliance, we call for the implementation of an effective, efficient and non-discriminatory verification regime. The treaty should, in our view, contain a provision on the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, we call on the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to further specify, strengthen, and institutionalize peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms as a means of ensuring treaty compliance. The treaty should be used to communicate a universal commitment to the non-violent settlement of international disputes. We also wish to refer the members of the Conference to the "People's test-ban treaty" which NGOs submitted to you a year or so ago.

"The rationale for a comprehensive test-ban treaty extends beyond peace and disarmament concerns. The radiation produced by nuclear-weapons testing is adversely affecting public health globally through the contamination of food, air and water. It is damaging the gene pool, and causing high rates of infant mortality, cancer, leukaemia, birth defects and immune system disorders.

"The non-proliferation Treaty. We view the negotiation of a CTBT as facilitating the discussion of the larger non-proliferation issue. Early negotiation of a CTBT will strengthen the prospects for a successful outcome of the non-proliferation Treaty review and extension conference in 1995. As preparations continue for this conference, we stress the urgent need to open genuine negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, and address the discriminatory nature of some of the provisions of the Treaty.

"Fundamental to the NPT is the asymmetry between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. We therefore urge the

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Conference on Disarmament to adopt measures designed to address the security concerns of all nations. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will play a critical role in addressing the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. We also call on the Conference to commence negotiations on an international convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons, as identified in General Assembly resolution 48/76 B as "a matter of priority". We additionally support further discussion and eventual negotiation on disarmament and development as addressed in General Assembly resolution 48/75 A. Finally, we are encouraged that the Conference will commence negotiation on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

"Arms manufacture and transfers. As stated in General Assembly resolution 48/75 B, "the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, rests with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the largest stockpiles." Accordingly, we urge the nuclear-weapons States to accept their responsibility in halting the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear material and in dismantling existing arsenals. Recognizing the grave dangers conventional weapons pose as well, we support the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We welcome the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in promoting openness and transparency and wish for broader participation in the years to come. To progress further, we ask that the question of ensuring reductions in international arms transfers and sales be included in the mandate of the Committee.

"NGO access to the Conference on Disarmament. As in previous years, we again urge the Conference to widen NGO access to its work. To achieve disarmament requires not only the political will of Governments but also understanding and support by the peoples. Wide dissemination of information and education at the popular level is an essential aspect of accomplishing these tasks. NGOs have worldwide constituencies and networks through which to inform, educate and build support for disarmament measures and treaties. They can also be a valuable channel for collecting information and making it available to the Conference. This would be greatly facilitated if NGOs had better access to the Conference. NGOs actively promoting disarmament would welcome opportunities for discussions with members of the Conference on Disarmament on this matter. In the same light, we welcome the decision to open the remaining two NPT Conference preparatory committee meetings to NGOs.

"In conclusion, we would like to again thank the Conference on Disarmament for hearing our concerns and for addressing the issues we have raised here today. We wish to express our continued support of your efforts to achieve a safer and more peaceful world.

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"This joint statement is submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of the following non-governmental organizations: International Peace Bureau, International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations, Lutheran World Federation, Women for Peace, Geneva, Women for Peace, France, Women's International Democratic Federation, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, World Federation of United Nations Associations and World Peace Council."

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for reading this message. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to thank the NGOs for their message and wish them continuing success in their worthwhile endeavours.

Before giving the floor to those speakers inscribed today, I should like to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage in connection with the message we have just heard. I give the floor to India as Coordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. KUMAR (India): Mr. President, since this is the first time I am speaking in my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of 21 under your presidency, let me congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the CD. I extend our best wishes for all your endeavours.

I have taken the floor to express our appreciation and thank the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for their important statement - it is a healthy tradition. We feel that it is a useful contribution, since the Group of 21 believes in the importance of associating non-governmental organizations working for disarmament in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the Group of 21 for his statement. I now give the floor to Canada as Coordinator of the Western Group.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I have the honour to acknowledge and to welcome, on behalf of the Western Group in the Conference on Disarmament, the message from nine non-governmental organizations, and to thank them for the support they are giving to the Conference on Disarmament. The members of these organizations, both men and women, have demonstrated their fidelity to the high aims described in the statement, over many years.

Of particular importance is the constant support given to the Conference on Disarmament by the international women's community; and it is my particular honour to acknowledge and salute this constancy in the context of arrangements to mark International Women's Day on 8 March. During the most tense period of the cold war, we could count on not only their support, but their constant reminders that cooperation and dialogue are highly preferable to confrontation and mistrust. In this post-cold-war era, we share the hopes and fears expressed in the statement.

The Western Group is pleased to note the particular points made about the Conference on Disarmament's efforts in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban

treaty. The non-governmental organizations presenting this statement are undoubtedly aware that, on the issue of treaty verifications and compliance, their objectives and ours are very similar. We are grateful, however, for the recalling of the importance of some provision in the treaty to solve, through cooperative measures, differences which may arrive in ensuring treaty compliance. We will do well, in our efforts to agree on a settlement-of-disputes mechanism, to recall the spirit and the substance of these valuable suggestions. We will look forward to new ideas and contributions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the Western Group for his statement. I now give the floor to the Russian Federation as Coordinator of the East European Group.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I would like to take this opportunity to convey to the representatives of women's international organizations, as well as all our dear ladies participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, congratulations on the occasion of International Women's Day, which is extensively marked by celebrations in our country too. On behalf of the East European Group and on behalf of the Russian delegation, allow me to express our sincere gratitude for the message addressed to our forum. In it we see evidence of the determination of the better and, I must say, the larger half of humanity to fight for a better future for our planet, for a world without war or the nuclear threat. Our Conference on Disarmament - and I am sure all those participating in it will support me in this - will do everything to justify these hopes of yours.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Coordinator of the East European Group for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, first of all I would like to warmly congratulate you on behalf of the Chinese delegation on taking up the CD Presidency. I am confident that under your presidency the work of the CD will be crowned with success. I would like to take this opportunity also to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Errera of France, for his contributions.

Like other delegations the Chinese delegation welcomes among us the delegates of nine non-governmental and international women's organizations, including the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. We have listened to their message with attention. We certainly congratulate them on the effort they have made in promoting disarmament and peace and would also like to thank them for their support and understanding of the CD's work. The Chinese delegation once again warmly congratulates them on 8 March, International Women's Day. At the same time please also allow me to extend our festive greetings to women colleagues of all delegations and women staff in the Secretariat and all women present.

The message we have just heard contained a reference to the fourth World Conference on Women. In this connection the Chinese delegation is pleased to point out that in accordance with the resolution of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the fourth World Conference on Women will be held in September 1995 in Beijing, China's capital. This is a major event for all women in China and the world at large. At present the Chinese Government is working with many women's organizations in China in active preparations for this Conference so that we will be able to warmly welcome the representatives from Governments and non-governmental women's organizations. The expected number of participants will be about 30,000. The women and the people of China will do their very best to contribute to the success of that Conference.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, first I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to join previous speakers in warmly welcoming in our midst the 1994 women's gathering in connection with International Women's Day. We thank them for the important message just read out by Ms. Mackby. In the past few years substantial progress has been made in the field of disarmament. The START agreements foresee drastic reductions of existing nuclear arsenals, and negotiations have started in this Conference with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Steps are furthermore being taken towards the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is important that this process enjoys universal support. In this context, Governments as well as NGOs and private individuals play an important role. We therefore highly appreciate the message of the women's gathering. Over the years, many women have made significant contributions to the cause of peace and disarmament. In this context, I would like to recall the names of my compatriots, Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson. They both represent a deep commitment to global peace and disarmament, both in their capacity as official representatives of my country and as women. They indeed constitute a source of inspiration for all women who work for disarmament, peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: Before taking up the list of speakers I have mentioned, allow me to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Australia, Ambassador Richard Starr, who is with us for the first time today. I am sure I speak for all of us when I say that we look forward to working closely with him and wish him a fruitful and satisfying involvement in the Conference on Disarmament.

The first speaker on my list today is the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ho.

Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to extend my warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of this important conference. My delegation is confident that under your wise and experienced guidance productive results will be achieved. You can be assured that my delegation will provide you with its fullest support during your term as President of this body. On behalf of my delegation, I would also like to extend

my sincere appreciation to the preceding President, Ambassador Errera of France, for his leadership during the initial part of this year's session. As this is the first occasion that I am taking the floor at the current session, I would like to convey my hearty congratulations to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky on his assumption last December of the post of Secretary-General of the CD. I would also like to appreciate and welcome the message of the women's organizations.

I have requested the floor today to explain my Government's position on major issues before this multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Before proceeding further, I would like to comment briefly on the direction of Korea's efforts to cope with recent developments on a global and regional level.

Since the end of the cold war, new international security concerns have surfaced, characterized by regional conflicts, such as that in Bosnia and Somalia. There is also a growing danger stemming from the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and long-range missiles. These trends pose challenges to the preservation of peace and security. Against this backdrop, there cannot be a stable and enduring peace without international cooperative efforts to control the worldwide spread of arms. In order to do this, the international cooperative system must be further strengthened, particularly within the framework of the United Nations and other relevant international organs. This is why my Government, under the leadership of President Kim Young Sam, has undertaken a recent initiative to intensify Korea's efforts to become involved in the international process through greater participation in the process of multilateral exercises, including arms control and disarmament.

Given the growing worldwide threat of regional conflicts, we cannot but put more emphasis on the importance of regional disarmament and the arms control process. In this regard, the specific characteristics of each region should be taken into account as a main component in the discussion of regional disarmament and arms control efforts. Turning our attention to the regional situation in north-east Asia we have come to recognize the necessity of establishing an appropriate cooperative regional security system designed to prevent armed conflicts and secure peace and stability by increasing military predictability.

As an initial effort toward preserving regional peace and security, confidence-building measures (CBMs) should be worked out and implemented on a gradual and step-by-step basis between the States in the region. CBMs would lead to enhanced mutual understanding and trust, and reduce tension and distrust among the countries concerned. With respect to arms control on the Korean peninsula, the Government of the Republic of Korea has maintained a consistent position favouring the gradual implementation of CBMs. We have also been consistent in emphasizing diplomatic efforts to work out a solution to the recent nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula through dialogue among the parties directly concerned. My Government hopes that nuclear transparency on the Korean peninsula will be enhanced through the prompt implementation of a complete international inspection

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regime. This would contribute to peace and security in north-east Asia and throughout the world.

My delegation's foremost concern for this year is to strengthen further the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Due to the inhumane and indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons, my delegation is deeply concerned about any possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. We share with many other nations the strong hope that these heinous weapons will be eliminated. In an effort to strengthen the current non-proliferation regime, we are obliged to deal with the two following tasks in the context of multilateral disarmament: one is to extend the NPT in 1995, and the other is to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date.

The year 1995 will mark a watershed in international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons as it is in 1995 that a conference will be convened to decide whether the NPT shall remain in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. My Government has faithfully observed the provisions of the NPT since its accession to the Treaty in 1975. Regardless of its discriminatory nature, the Treaty has contributed to the prevention of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we hope that the NPT will be indefinitely extended in 1995, and that the NPT regime will be thoroughly reviewed and every effort will be made to improve the Treaty by strengthening the present nuclear safeguards system through reinforcement of its inspection regime. By doing so, the NPT would be assured of remaining a cornerstone for building a more peaceful and secure world. We should also seek to facilitate further the transfer of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes. My Government will continue to participate actively in the discussions of the preparatory committee for the 1995 NPT conference, and will focus its efforts on extending and strengthening the NPT regime.

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of an effective, verifiable and comprehensive multilateral test-ban treaty which will attract the adherence of all States, my delegation reaffirms its full support for multilateral efforts to conclude the CTBT, and at the same time extends its deep appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its subsidiary bodies, for their continuing effort to conclude the CTBT. My Government has consistently encouraged international efforts for the early conclusion of the CTBT, with a firm belief that the early conclusion of the CTBT would be a positive step toward the 1995 extension of the NPT. My delegation expects that there will be substantial progress in the global effort to conclude the CTBT. For this purpose, all existing proposals for the draft CTBT should be taken into account, and efforts should be taken to facilitate the prompt achievement of a consensus centred on the rolling text. Our desire is to use the present momentum to establish an effective verification regime and a solid institutional foundation. It is also our hope that concrete progress will be made to conclude the CTBT before the 1995 NPT extension conference.

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In an effort to promote transparency in military matters, the United Nations General Assembly took an important step forward by adopting resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, in accordance with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established on 1 January 1992. My delegation notes with great satisfaction that in 1992, 83 United Nations Member States submitted data on imports and exports of arms for the United Nations Register, and a significant portion of international arms transfers for the same year were covered. Given that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States, the Register is expected to be further developed into a universal and comprehensive confidence-building instrument for the promotion of transparency in military matters, thereby promoting genuine peace and security throughout the world.

My delegation firmly believes that further development of the Register can only be achieved with the widest possible participation of the Member States. In parallel, my delegation hopes that other related matters pertaining to resolution 46/36 L, such as definitions, inclusion of data on military holdings, and procurement through national production, will be duly addressed at this year's Conference. Inclusion of such matters would constitute a substantive change in the scope of the Register. In this connection, my delegation would like to draw attention to its annual White Paper on national defence, which my Government has issued since 1988. The White Paper deals in detail with its defence budget, procurement policies and defence capabilities, in both material and personnel terms.

The end of East-West confrontation and the resulting improvement in international relations form a sound basis for promoting further openness and transparency in all military matters. Multilateral disarmament negotiations must be a centrepiece in the maintenance of post-cold-war peace and security. The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, is called upon to reflect the present post-cold-war atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation by restructuring itself, thereby securing universality for its own sake. In this regard, my delegation would like to extend once again its sincere appreciation to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan for his untiring efforts during the 1993 session to achieve both understanding and agreement on the issue of CD expansion. Simultaneously, we cannot but express deep regret with the fact that the CD has not yet been able to reach a consensus on its own expansion. My delegation is of the opinion that the issue of CD expansion should be resolved without further delay and without any counter-productive and undesirable linkage to other extraneous and unrelated matters. In this sense, my delegation strongly urges all member States of the CD to reconsider the CD's credibility and to adopt the O'Sullivan report on this issue by consensus. The principle of consensus should not be exploited as a means to address specific political concerns not directly related to the CD.

Before concluding my statement, I would like to reiterate my Government's support for the three key concepts: integration, globalization, and revitalization, which were enunciated by the Secretary-General of the

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United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 "New dimensions" report. My delegation believes that those three themes should lay the foundation for an intensified international effort to enhance the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament in the decades to come.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo, who will be addressing the Conference for the first time.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President in this important period of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has for the first time embarked on real negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is an issue of political importance to all States in this room, and indeed to global security in the longer term. As the sole international negotiating forum for disarmament the CD shoulders a heavy responsibility in getting these negotiations on track with a view to reaching an agreement as soon as possible. We believe it is essential that the negotiations proceed in earnest and without procedural delays. My delegation is convinced that the

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Conference will benefit from your wise and able leadership, Ambassador Hoffman, in facing up to the challenge. I offer the full support of my delegation in your endeavours.

As this is the first time I address the Conference, let me also offer the full support and cooperation of my delegation to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Under-Secretary-General, Vladimir Petrovsky, to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Bensmail, and to the rest of the secretariat of the Conference. I would also like to associate my delegation with the expressions of welcome to the efforts made over many years by women, individually and through NGOs, for the cause of disarmament.

This is the first time my delegation addresses the Conference since the start of the CTBT negotiations. I would like to offer a few preliminary views on some of the issues facing us. First of all, we recognize that there are interactions between progress towards a global ban on nuclear test explosions, and the possibilities for maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons. We believe it in our own and in the best interests of all countries to adhere to a non-proliferation regime, since a further spread of nuclear weapons can only diminish regional and global security. This aim is best secured by international legal instruments. We are pleased that negotiations on a CTBT are now proceeding in parallel with the preparations for the NPT review and extension conference. Substantial results on the CTBT by the end of 1994 will contribute significantly to a successful outcome of the 1995 conference. On the other hand, lack of substantial progress on the CTBT could indeed put the NPT conference in serious jeopardy. Secondly, national moratoria on nuclear testing have produced an auspicious political atmosphere for the negotiations. Such moratoria are also conducive to the preservation of the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, there is increasing political concern in many countries, including my own, for the environmental impact of nuclear testing. The Norwegian Government urges the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further nuclear tests.

A CTBT should indeed be global, banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. The definition given in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 provides a good basis for the CTBT scope definition. Peaceful nuclear explosions will have to be included, as they have been in the Swedish draft treaty proposal. We believe this draft is a must useful starting-point for the negotiations. A CTBT verification regime should be sufficiently strong and effective to ensure that any potential violator stands a severe risk of being detected. A 100 per cent control system is probably not achievable, or affordable. A global seismic network would form the basis for the verification system, supplemented by other techniques that might be deemed useful and fall within acceptable cost parameters. We look forward to the third global seismic test (GSETT-3) that is now being prepared by the Group of Seismic Experts. It is of particular importance that commitments are now given from the States possessing alpha stations to take part in the experiment. Norway stands ready to take an active part in this crucial test. Within available resources we are prepared to provide technical assistance to

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countries who might need such assistance to take part in GSETT-3. For monitoring of a CTBT we would at present envisage a small, dedicated monitoring agency, drawing on available international expertise as necessary.

Over the last week we have witnessed a most useful presentation of non-seismic verification techniques within the verification Work Group. Some of these seem to offer useful supplementary methods of providing global coverage in all environments for the supervision of a CTBT. During the last session Norway submitted a working paper on non-seismic methods, particularly devoted to hydroacoustics. I hope it will be possible to engage our experts in the sessions devoted to these methods during the month of May. As negotiations progress in the Conference, my delegation will seek to make its contribution also in other fields.

We should not expect the CTBT to be a perfect agreement from all perspectives. It will be a compromise between differing interests and concerns. The perfect should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good. Otherwise, we will not achieve a treaty in a time-frame when it is still politically relevant.

I have emphasized the efforts of the Conference in one area. Let me note that Norway is pleased that the Conference on Disarmament has found it possible to devote attention also to the important issues of negative security assurances, to transparency in armaments, and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, having established respective committees for these subjects. In addition we fully support the important task given to Ambassador Shannon of Canada as Coordinator for the issue of cut-off in the production of fissile material.

It will not be news to anyone here that Norway takes an active interest in becoming a member of the Conference on Disarmament. Our application was submitted no less than 14 years ago. Our joy was understandably great - also at the highest political level in Oslo - when Ambassador O'Sullivan presented his list of new members in August of last year. This was the second time Norway appeared on the short-list for an expansion of the Conference. But great was also our disappointment when again it appeared that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to bring about the expansion. Our hopes for a solution have been rekindled and extinguished several times in the intervening period, with the various solutions that were ardently pursued by Ambassadors Zahran and Errera. So far the CD seems only able to agree to disagree. The expansion issue in our view needs a rapid solution, inter alia, to provide a broader basis for the CTBT negotiations. The most reasonable and feasible way forward would seem to be the adoption by the CD of Ambassador O'Sullivan's proposal, if necessary on the basis of the more recent proposal by Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico. We urge the Conference to continue to give the issue of expansion high priority. I take this opportunity to reiterate that my country would be ready to take her seat as a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first and foremost allow me to congratulate you on performing the functions of President of this Conference and assure you of the full support and cooperation of my delegation. We have asked for the floor to present the views of the Argentine delegation on some of the main items on our agenda.

My country is committed to the results of the negotiations for the realization of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Consequently, above and beyond the position we have set out in the Ad Hoc Committee, we would like to comment in greater detail here on some of the aspects of that position and explain others. One of these is the concept of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In this connection, and in view of the fact that a country that is a member of this Conference has expressed some doubts about the content of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and about this type of explosion, I would like to provide clarification on this point. Tlatelolco allows, under certain conditions, something that the NPT prohibits: the possibility of carrying out what are called peaceful nuclear explosions. Despite this, no such explosions have ever been carried out in the region, nor is the possibility that any member country of the Treaty will carry one out being envisaged. Indeed, the interpretation of the member States, as reflected in various OPANAL documents, is that the carrying out of such explosions could be permitted only if the technology necessary was different from that used in the production of nuclear weapons. Obviously this is not the case. Likewise, under the Treaty all the States parties must sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In practice this is the same type of agreement signed by the countries belonging to the NPT, prohibiting the explosive use of nuclear energy. Indeed, we cannot fail to point out that the two countries of the region which might perhaps have been best placed to carry out this type of test, Argentina and Brazil, have ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA, by virtue of which they undertook to apply safeguards to all nuclear material as well as to all activities of the same type carried out on their territory or in any place under their jurisdiction or control, for the sole purpose of verifying that such material was not diverted for nuclear weapons or for "any other nuclear explosive device".

In addition to this, Argentina and Brazil included in article I, paragraph 3 of the bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, signed in Guadalajara, Mexico on 18 June 1991 and ratified by the Parliaments of both countries, the following clause:

> "Bearing in mind that at present no technical distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes, the Parties also undertake to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories, and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or from participating in any way in, the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any nuclear explosive device while the above-mentioned technical limitation exists."

On the basis of this Latin American consensus on the matter, and considering that any nuclear explosion in itself produces benefits in the military sphere, our position is clearly in favour of ensuring that the treaty that we are negotiating here prohibits explosions of all types at all times in all places. We also believe that the treaty should clearly stipulate a comprehensive ban and should not be subject to any threshold. However, with regard to what are called "preparatory activities", we believe that the extension of the ban to the various stages of these could affect activities that are not actually being carried out for testing purposes. Indeed, we fear that they might complicate the verification regime of the treaty. However, the subject deserves greater analysis and we are prepared to consider the various points of view on this matter.

The credibility of the nuclear-test-ban treaty will to a very great extent depend on the verification regime. Therefore, an effective verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability composed of various elements - seismic, hydroacoustic, atmospheric sampling of radionuclides and waste gases - as well as provisions for on-site inspection. The exchange of information among States parties could also help identify any violations. On-site inspections should be a special and decisive deterrent element, and therefore the treaty should contain effective and efficient procedures for controlled inspection. The verification regime will have to rely on information from all possible sources, either supplied by international organizations or by States parties. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction at the very good work being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts under the leadership of Dr. Dahlman and in response to the request he made during the last plenary meeting of the Conference, I have pleasure in announcing my country's undertaking that all our seismological stations will participate for the attainment of the objectives and the success of Group of Seismic Experts' Technical Test No. 3 (GSETT-3). We will also contribute to the work of this Group through the participation of an expert starting with the meetings that will take place during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament.

As far as institutions are concerned, it is very clear for us that a small international organization should be set up for the application of the treaty, especially its verification and compliance regimes. This body should be able to handle the exchange of important information concerning monitoring and constitute a forum for the rapid review of requests for on-site inspections, as well as for the discussion and joint treatment of any questions relating to compliance with its provisions submitted by States parties to the treaty. Obviously the treaty will have to have a sanctions regime that will include strong collective action in the event of violation of its provisions, including, in the final analysis, resort to the United Nations Security Council. In this connection we believe that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could usefully serve as a model for devising an appropriate sanctions regime. Yet above and beyond any consensus that we might reach on all these aspects, the success of the NTB Treaty will only be possible if it enjoys the participation of the five nuclear-

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weapon States and broad international support, the only means of attaining the desired goal of non-proliferation.

Transparency in armaments is a subject of special importance for the Argentine Republic. Last year, the Conference established for the first time an Ad Hoc Committee on this item. Various specific proposals were tabled, intensive discussions were held on these, especially on questions referring to military holdings and procurement through national production. There were approximately 15 working papers on the table, some of them containing proposals on practical, universal and non-discriminatory means to increase transparency and openness. Moreover, the participation of more than 80 countries in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is in our view a very good start. Nevertheless, much still remains to be done in order to bring about universal participation and the availability of information that will give us a realistic and far-reaching view of the international situation in this matter and its evolution.

We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General, set out in his 1992 report on disarmament, that transparency is no substitute for reductions in arms, but that when properly applied, it can be conductive to confidence-building among States and helpful in alerting the global community to excessive accumulations of armaments. Thus, it could serve as another useful tool in facilitating non-proliferation efforts.

Therefore, we resolutely support the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as well as the work of the Group of Governmental Experts established to devise techniques and procedures for the Register and study arrangements for its future expansion. Moreover, we share the view that openness and transparency are important as part of the process of strengthening confidence and that they should be emphasized at the regional and subregional levels. In this connection, the regional seminars sponsored by the United Nations have already proved useful. This was the case for the regional seminar on the Register for the transfer of conventional arms on the American continent which was organized by my country under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Disarmament in 1993.

Another demonstration of Argentina's interest in these activities at the regional level is the forthcoming holding in Buenos Aires between 15 and 18 March of a meeting of experts on measures for strengthening mutual trust and security mechanisms in the region, a meeting sponsored by the Organization of American States, whose central aim is to promote better dialogue on security and cooperation matters among the nations of our hemisphere. We regret that the Director of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs has announced that for budgetary reasons the Centre will not be present at this important regional event. In November 1993 a preparatory meeting for the expert meeting to be held in Buenos Aires was held at OAS headquarters in Washington. At that time representatives of various member countries described the different activities under way in the region on confidence-building measures. We would like to refer to one or two of them. Argentina and Brazil made presentations on

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bilateral agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Colombia and Venezuela on confidence-building measures between the two countries; Honduras, representing Central America, on the new treaty on Central American security; the Caribbean countries on security problems in a region with no armed forces. In addition, Argentina referred to the confidence-building measures agreed with the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic region.

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Despite the fact that in 1993 very interesting discussions were held in this Conference, we have to be realistic and acknowledge that we only scratched the surface of the subject of transparency in armaments, exchanging views on a number of important questions but without taking any specific step with regard to them. We suggest that the Ad Hoc Committee should take up the subject where it left off last September, focusing its attention principally on matters relating to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

We also think that the Conference should transmit to the Group of Experts its views on these matters and on the Register of Conventional Arms. The appropriate way of doing this would be at the end of May so that the Group of Experts could take the views of the Conference on Disarmament into consideration before concluding its work. This contribution would be in complete consonance with the mandate of the Conference. In order to facilitate our discussions we think it will be appropriate to give careful consideration to the specific documents submitted last year that refer to transparency and openness in the conventional field, the size and organization of armed forces, the declaration of closure and conversion of military facilities and regional transparency - this last a matter on which my country has taken more than one practical and concrete initiative.

My delegation put before the Conference for its consideration in 1993 a document (CD/TIA/WP.14) concerning weapons of mass destruction as another area that should be studied and considered by the Conference with a view to elaborating practical means aimed at enhancing transparency, in accordance with the existing legal instruments. Argentina believes that the overall process of transparency should be gradual and balanced, in order to ensure its universality and successful implementation. This requires that weapons of mass destruction should also be addressed as an integral part of a more general process that covers other segments spelled out in resolution 46/36, such as conventional arms, equipment, holdings, personnel and information on the transfer of high technology with military applications.

We think that it is a challenge for the Conference on Disarmament to devote itself to these initiatives regarding transparency in armaments and we share the views already expressed by other delegations to the effect that this transparency is the vehicle that leads to the development of measures to build up confidence and to share information, efforts that are not costly, do not require verification regimes and are not reflected in the structure of a "cut-off" treaty.

Finally, we think that nuclear non-proliferation would also benefit considerably from a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We favour the timely negotiation of an overall agreement to prohibit the continued production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or those that are not subject to international safeguards. This agreement should be

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formally negotiated within this Conference on Disarmament. This could place the nuclear programmes of certain countries that are not

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covered by international safeguards under certain containment measures, and at the same time would curb the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five nuclear Powers.

The challenges facing the Conference are enormous, but we believe we are engaged in this fruitful exercise to respond to the hopes of the international community for greater stability, transparency and security.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you well and assure you of my full cooperation. On the same occasion I would like to pay tribute to your predecessor Ambassador Errera of France. I am confident that with your efficiency and humour the Conference on Disarmament is indeed in good hands. I also wish to seize this opportunity to welcome among us Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia, with whom I look forward to cooperating; I wish him a successful mission. My delegation has always maintained close ties with the dynamic Australian delegation, not only in the CD but also in all other forums. I also wish to welcome in our midst Ambassador Bjørn Skogmo of Norway. I look forward to cooperating with him and his delegation and I wish his country, Norway, together with other countries non-members of the CD, an early solution to the expansion issue. I refer to his statement and the statement of Ambassador Ho of the Republic of Korea. I wish to see them both in the near future as fully-fledged members of the CD as well as all other applicants.

I would not want to miss this opportunity to fully support the words of appreciation directed by the G.21 Coordinator, the representative of India, to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. On behalf of nine NGOs, whose statement was read by Ms. Mackby, I would like to congratulate the League and all women on this occasion of commemorating International Women's Day. The views expressed by the nine NGOs on the issues inscribed on the CD agenda are most useful in the framework of the disarmament deliberations in general, and the work of the CD in particular. My delegation looks forward to direct NGO participation in the CD, as is the case in virtually all other forums, whether within or outside the United Nations system. The knowledge, views and experience of NGOs which are active in the field of disarmament can only enrich the work of the CD as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

The issue of transparency in armaments is a subject which has now made its appearance on the CD agenda for the third consecutive year. While I believe it is fair to state that we all support and firmly believe in the ultimate objectives of transparency in armaments, namely to increase confidence, strengthen security and enhance stability at both the regional and international levels, I also believe that it is clear that we do not all agree about how we should proceed towards these objectives.

Following the adoption of resolution 46/36 L at the General Assembly, Egypt was one of the countries which supported a swift response by the Conference on Disarmament to the request made to it in paragraphs 12 to 15

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of resolution 46/36 L. I even had the privilege and honour of serving as the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of transparency in armaments and later on as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. My delegation's swift response to the request of the General Assembly, and our willingness to accept the addition of a new item on our CD agenda, can only be seen as a gesture of good will, particularly given the fact that too many other items on our agenda, and especially the nuclear items, have been neglected or consciously left dormant for much too long.

Today, I cannot hide my country's surprise at the way an issue as promising as that of transparency in armaments, and I underline that by armaments we mean all armaments, is being treated in a fashion that aims at widening even further the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Thus, while for the time being we are all required to disclose information on the same categories of arms, the information provided by some speaks volumes about their military capabilities while the same information provided by others, even though we do not doubt its accuracy, hardly scratches the surface of their military potential. Thus, the vital security interests of the latter are kept intact while those of the former are largely exposed, which in effect means that the same transparency measures applied in different contexts can have very different effects, both on the positive and negative sides of the scale.

The Egyptian delegation is perplexed by the fact that statements made this year and working papers circulated on the issue of transparency in armaments were designed to perpetrate the idea that the exercise of transparency should be limited to conventional arms and then only to certain types of conventional arms. We have repeatedly stated, and continue to do so, that if it is to be an effective confidence-building measure, and act as an early warning mechanism in case of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, transparency in armaments must apply to all armaments including weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, high technology with military applications and all types of conventional weapons.

Given the fact that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments derived from resolution 46/36 L provides for our work to conclude at the end of 1994, we must therefore ensure that we avoid spending our limited time on issues which fall outside the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and which the General Assembly has not requested the Conference on Disarmament to examine such as military forces, budgets, etc. At least we should concentrate instead on all the questions we are explicitly asked to examine.

With respect to weapons of mass destruction and transfers of high technology with military applications, we are conscious of the fact that there exists a network of international agreements covering weapons of mass destruction. I do not wish here to outline the loopholes of this network, and particularly the fact that it cannot yet claim to be universal and that a number of States from all camps have, at best, ignored their commitments or even violated them. It is therefore evident that pending universal adherence to, and full implementation

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of, all legal instruments relating to weapons of mass destruction, such weapons must be subjected to the transparency exercise. The inventory of these arms, which are considered to be both excessive and destabilizing by their very nature, should include, inter alia, stocks and production capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. This is also a confidence-building measure. If weapons of mass destruction are not reported to the Register, we would have deliberately omitted an extremely important factor which determines how far the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms at the disposal of such or such a country can threaten international peace and security. Thus the international community cannot get an early warning in the case of an aggression or threat of aggression.

We also heard, on numerous occasions, that a great deal of information was already publicly available on weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons. While these arguments may be partially true, it applies to an even larger extent to conventional arms, including the seven categories of the Register, and it is hence only logical that having gone through the trouble of setting up a Register of Conventional Arms, this same Register should expand to cover weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to transfers of high technology with military applications, we are of the view that such transfers need also to be reported, since access by some to advanced technology can have a destabilizing and aggravating effect, particularly in those areas of the world with regional conflicts. Accurate and effective reporting of transfers of high technology with military applications would enhance transparency and might even become an adequate substitute for certain export control measures which can be applied selectively by allowing certain States to benefit from advanced technologies while denying others the same privilege.

In the statements we made before the Ad Hoc Committee last year we repeatedly stressed the importance of agreeing on the definitions of the terms we most commonly use in our daily work. We continue to hold this view, and we believe that no concrete measure to enhance transparency can be a good and practicable one unless there is an agreed common denominator and common definition of terms used therein. My delegation was gratified to note the United States views as expressed in TIA working paper 19 that the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts in New York should work towards a universal definition of "transfers". In our view, the same holds true here at the CD for terms such as "military holdings", "procurement through national production", "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms", etc. In this context, let me state that my delegation is not comfortable with the definitions proposed so far for certain terms, and in particular "military holdings" and "procurement through national production". First and foremost, we firmly believe that our work must have a much wider scope than the very limited one of the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Given the fact that a primary objective of the transparency exercise is to provide the international community with an early warning system aimed at detecting excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms, it is only logical that all categories and types of arms,

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including advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, should form an intrinsic part of our common understanding or definitions, and we cannot see on what grounds any arms would be excluded or disassociated from an agreed definition. We also believe that the physical location of arms should not be a ground for exclusion. Thus, arms located within or outside national territory or territorial waters must also be subjected to reporting and transparency measures. The same holds true for all arms maintained in stocks or in storage, arms leased or lent or in any other way placed at the disposal of a foreign country, arms undergoing research, development, testing or evaluation, etc. It is also the view of the Egyptian delegation that we must avoid the proliferation of a multitude of instruments covering various aspects of the transparency question. Such a multi-dimensional approach would only make reporting requirements more complex and might, rather than promote transparency, blur the general picture. It is therefore necessary for us to focus our work on the expansion of the United Nations Register rather than the development of new mechanisms.

Finally, I wish to seize this opportunity to recall that Egypt has reservations with regard to the shortcomings of the Register in its present form. These reservations are reflected in our submission to the United Nations Register in 1993. We therefore can only urge all those who have, prior to the adoption of resolution 46/36 L, given clear undertakings with regard to the revision and expansion of the Register, to fulfil these commitments. The lack of substantive progress in this regard would undoubtedly overshadow the commitment of various countries with regard to future reporting.

I wish lastly to state that my delegation is participating actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. We will also be looking very closely at the willingness of all delegations to address seriously the very legitimate concerns and preoccupations of a large number of CD members and non-members and a much larger number of States throughout the community of nations. Our observations here at the CD and the assessment of our work carried out in other forums will be the determining factors likely to influence our position on any future TIA resolution at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Lampreia.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): Mr. President, let me begin by expressing my delegation's satisfaction at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your diplomatic skills, which have already been proven, and experience constitute an important asset to this crucial stage of our deliberations. You can be assured that we shall cooperate in every way towards the satisfactory outcome of our work. Let me also express our gratitude to Ambassador Gérard Errera, your predecessor, for the able and energetic manner in which he conducted our business during his tenure as President of the CD.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Several speakers have highlighted the relevance of this year's work, particularly on account of the negotiation of a CTBT. My delegation has no doubt that it constitutes the most important issue before us and we are confident in the CD's capacity to meet the international community's expectations in this regard. We are encouraged by the work already done and are grateful to the delegations of Sweden and Australia for the papers they

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have provided. Let me also put on record our special thanks to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, who has recently left us and who has made such a direct and personal contribution to our present undertaking.

As many others here represented, my Government has been a long-standing supporter of a CTBT. We have always maintained that there is an indissoluble link between disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBT represents the instrumentation of such a concept, inasmuch as it affects both dimensions of this same question. It must be recalled that the traditional purpose of a CTBT has been to put a curb to the nuclear arms race, as an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament, as has already been spelled out in even broader terms in the partial test-ban treaty. There have been significant and positive changes in the international scenario since these matters were first discussed. They have not, however, altered the need to pursue that goal or diminished the relevance of a CTBT for its achievement.

Some delegations consider the future CTBT as an additional instrument to avoid horizontal non-proliferation. We welcome the further assurances that the Treaty shall bring in this regard. We consider, however, that a CTBT, to be effective, must have an impact on vertical proliferation. The CTBT has to have a direct bearing on horizontal proliferation or it will not fulfil one of its objectives, but it also has to have a direct bearing on the nuclear arms race and the ability to improve and update nuclear weapons or it will not fulfil its other objective. We have to work within these boundaries, and we have already given this Committee a clear mandate in this direction. Furthermore, from Tlatelolco to IAEA safeguards, there already exists a number of relevant multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at impeding horizontal proliferation. The CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but one that must be elaborated in light of existing agreements in the area of non-proliferation, disarmament and international security. What we now require is a treaty of a different nature. One that takes a broader step, long overdue, to curb vertical proliferation.

As you know, Brazil is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty, not on account of its non-proliferation commitments, which we entirely share, but because we have perceived always inherent inequities in that instrument. Our commitment to non-proliferation has been reinforced since 1990, through a series of joint initiatives we undertook with Argentina, of which you are all well aware. Central among these is the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is a full-scope safeguards agreement, as is well known, providing the same assurances on horizontal proliferation as those required by the NPT. I am very glad to say that the Brazilian Congress has recently approved this agreement last month and that my Government promulgated it on 24 February.

We wish to express our appreciation to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, under whose competent guidance we were able to reach agreement on the mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee. The mandate calls for "a universal and multilaterally and

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effectively verifiable" treaty. Universality requires that the treaty be open to the signature of all States and that we engage our best efforts to assure their adherence. To fulfil this determination it is my Government's belief that the treaty has to be non-discriminatory, meaning that it should stipulate equal rights and equal obligations. This condition is specifically relevant to the basic undertakings, the verification regime and the mechanisms for the application of sanctions that are to be established.

For Brazil, the central achievement of a CTBT is to enshrine in an international document the commitment of States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to engage no more in nuclear testing. We engage in these negotiations with a very open mind and are ready to give serious consideration to all earnest proposals, as long as they fall in line with our basic requirement of a universal and non-discriminatory treaty. We are therefore flexible, which is not to say that we do not have our ideas related to the treaty. I would like to share with you some of our thoughts.

The first basic issue to be addressed is the scope of the undertaking. Ideally, we would like to see a treaty that bans all nuclear experiments aimed at the development, maintenance or improvement of nuclear weapons. We acknowledge that this is a very broad commitment, but we also consider it to be the one that fully reflects the long-standing aspirations of the international community and that adequately covers the two objectives we have identified. On the other hand we have also to acknowledge the political, technical and financial limitations we face. Therefore, without losing sight of our ultimate objectives, we are prepared to accept a more limited scope.

We accept that the CTBT is not to be a treaty banning nuclear weapons, but neither is it to be one in which we construe an explicit or implicit legitimation of those weapons, for this would be in direct opposition to its traditional objective. We wish to avoid a debate on these issues as we believe it would be repetitive and fruitless. We believe it can be done without detriment to the consistency and effectiveness of our work. In order to do so, we must concentrate on what we increasingly perceive as our common objective, namely the prohibition of all types of nuclear explosive tests in all environments for an unlimited period of time.

We are ready to accept the proscription of peaceful nuclear explosions. This is, however, a delicate question and requires careful attention. We acknowledge that there are presently no distinctions between explosive devices for peaceful purposes and others. We also acknowledge that peaceful nuclear explosions can serve for the development of nuclear weapons or for their improvement. That is why in our view they must be prohibited. But we must not impose limitations on potentially important scientific and technological developments. We have no precise proposals in this regard, but we perceive this concern to be shared by other delegations and we are convinced we can find an appropriate way of incorporating it into the treaty.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

We do not favour the inclusion of a broad and all-encompassing proscription of preparation in the undertaking. Several delegations have pointed out the problems this might engender. The first one relates to the difficulty if not impossibility of distinguishing preparation of licit activities from that of proscribed ones. The second relates to the

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verification requirements it would impose. Our concerns do not mean that we rule out any aspect of preparations, such as the monitoring of nuclear test sites.

In order to provide States members with the confidence required by the relevance of their commitments, the CTBT must have an effective verification regime. We must not, however, be over-ambitious in this task and set verification standards that become impossible to achieve. The CTBT is of course a political instrument. Its essential value lies in the commitment of States parties. We all aspire to an effective verification regime, but we cannot hold the scope and the commitments we are going to undertake hostage to excessive verification demands. When elaborating the verification system it is very important to take into account that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument, but that it will integrate a number of other instruments, mechanisms and regimes to which it bears close relation. We cannot conceive the CTBT's verification system as being unrelated and completely independent from IAEA safeguards and the future verification of a cut-off agreement. The verification of a CTBT does not necessarily require the accounting of nuclear material. But the accounting of nuclear material can indicate that member States are not diverting it for nuclear explosive purposes, thus providing the assurances required by a CTBT. If we take this into account, we can reduce the costs of the future verification regime and strengthen its effectiveness. IAEA safeguards require more than US$ 70 million annually. We do not believe we are in a position to overlook these figures and not to avail ourselves of the potential savings we may be able to achieve. Furthermore, we do not believe it wise to set up completely independent verification regimes for treaties or agreements that are essentially related to each other. This will again be very much the case if we can conclude an agreement on the cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear explosive purposes.

There is in our view a growing consensus on the understanding that seismic verification will constitute the basis of the additional verification required for underground testing. The Group of Scientific Experts has been examining this question for many years and its findings represent a valuable contribution to our work. My Government has recently committed itself to participation in such a Group. In order to reduce costs, national capacitation in this area has to be fully taken into account. This is, however, a delicate question that requires further consideration, for the multilateral verification regime must rely on unbiased and independent data.

With the possible exception of the accountability of all nuclear material, no single verification procedure or technique can effectively cover the full spectrum of potential nuclear explosions. That is the case with seismic verification. The CD has been examining a number of complementary techniques, directed mainly at environments other than underground. We hold this to be an important exercise, but we caution against speculation with unproven methods and undertaking over-ambitious proposals. On-site inspections may also come to play a very important role, even if only to be used on rare occasions. On account of the complex technical and operational problems involved, as well as the political

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questions raised, we strongly favour the evolutionary approach proposed by the delegation of Australia for the verification regime.

We have not discussed in detail the question of the organization that the treaty will require. We share the view that this question can only be adequately assessed once we have more clearly defined other issues such as scope and verification. My delegation does not believe that we are yet at a stage where we can determine whether the CTBT will require the establishment of new intergovernmental decision-making bodies. In order to carry out its verification responsibilities, however, it will certainly require a technical secretariat, which may be entirely new or set up within IAEA.

There have been a number of suggestions related to the organization. Some have mentioned the need for a new multilateral agency, with two deliberative intergovernmental instances and a technical secretariat. The first intergovernmental body would be open to all member States, the second, more restricted, would take the form of an executive council. The Australian proposal is the creation of a small CTBT organization co-located in Vienna with IAEA, in order to make the best use of its capacitation. The Swedish proposal is to entrust the verification of the CTBT to IAEA and to its Board of Governors the responsibility of decisions related to compliance and the need for additional verification such as on-site inspections. We find merits in both the Australian and the Swedish proposals.

The entry into force of the treaty should not be overcomplicated. This is a delicate question related to security concerns of all States. The ratification of the CTBT by all States having significant nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power stations and research reactors, has been suggested as a requirement for the entry into force of the treaty. The longer the list of required ratifications, the more probability of any single delegation impeding the entry into force of the agreement. That is not what we want. Again, in this instance we believe it is important to recall that the CTBT is not an isolated instrument. We therefore believe that when considering the conditions that might be required for the entry into force of the treaty, we should take into account what other binding multilateral commitments of relevance to the commitments of the CTBT States have already undertaken. This would facilitate the entry into force, without affecting legitimate security concerns of member States.

The rapid and significant developments of the international scene in recent years have allowed for the present propitious political climate for the negotiation of a CTBT. Let us make the best use of these circumstances and not lose the sense of urgency and responsibility required to achieve this long-standing objective of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic Peoples's Republic of Korea.

(Mr. Lampreia, Brazil)

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, it is my delegation's great pleasure to join others in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this month.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

A few weeks ago, I informed the Conference of the problems which we faced in our efforts to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. I would like to take this opportunity to briefly inform the Conference again about the latest development on the issue.

As already made public, four immediate steps of simultaneous action for a package solution of the nuclear issue were adopted at the New York contact between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States on 25 February. These steps cover the questions of discontinuing joint military exercises, resuming inter-Korean working-level contact for the exchange of special envoys and starting inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the continuity of safeguards, and the question of holding the third round of DPRK-United States of America talks in Geneva from 21 March.

Most of the agreed steps have already entered into a stage of practical implementation. Thus, new prospects have opened for bringing back to its original track the process of a peaceful solution of the nuclear issue which had been temporarily derailed. It is lucky, indeed, that although it seems belatedly, both sides confirmed again in the agreement their stand to seek a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue on the principles of the DPRK-United States of America joint statement announced in June last year and decided upon concrete steps and timetable of action.

The agreement on the steps of simultaneous action, however, has not been reached through a smooth process. In the past, we have advanced reasonable proposals for a solution of the nuclear problem and made all sincere efforts to carry them into effect and shown a flexibility. Since the second round of DPRK-United States of America talks we have fulfilled the obligations we assumed voluntarily, as far as we could, for the negotiation with IAEA and North-South dialogue. It is well worth noting that, with a view to removing obstacles in the way of the talks, we put forward a new proposal that the nuclear issue should be solved completely in a way of package deal based on the principle of simultaneous action by both sides.

If a solution of the nuclear issue had been promoted as proposed by us from the very outset, it would not have undergone such serious twists and turns in its course, and it would not have taken such a long time to reach a basic agreement on the steps of simultaneous action. In fact, when we take into consideration the fact that half-a-century-long history of confrontation and distrust has lasted between the DPRK and the United States, it is self-evident that either of them is not in a position to urge the other to show confidence first. That is why we have held that if both sides wanted to find a reasonable solution to the problem on an equal and fair basis, they should not urge the other to move first but act simultaneously, and so, have repeatedly urged them to respond to simultaneous action in this direction.

The agreed conclusions on the steps of simultaneous action this time has created a favourable condition for the third round of talks and a package

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solution of the nuclear issue. The DPRK and the United States, according to the formula of package deal agreed upon between them, must now take steps for a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue such as the termination of the United States nuclear threat and hostile policy against the DPRK, the introduction of light-water reactors, the improvement of bilateral relations, the resumption of IAEA's routine and ad hoc inspections of the DPRK's nuclear facilities, and put them into effect.

The package deal based on simultaneous action is the only practical and reasonable way for both sides to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue on a completely equal footing, not through confrontation. This has been clearly proved by the whole course of the DPRK-United States talks, especially by the latest contact in which two sides agreed on simultaneous action.

If the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is resolved in a package deal, it would be decisively conducive to ensuring peace and security in the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. It is only too clear that, no matter what reasonable solution may be adopted, if a party obliged to implement it has no willingness to solve the issue, it is impossible to expect any substantial results. Though just a few days have passed since the publication of the conclusions on simultaneous action, ill-boding moves have been reported one after another, giving rise to doubt about the willingness of the other negotiating party to implement the conclusions. They made an official announcement that the exchange of special convoys between the North and South Korea and IAEA's inspection are preconditions for the suspension of the "Team Spirit 94" joint military exercises and the opening of the third-round talks between the two sides. These are acts to endanger the implementation of the agreement, which can never be justified.

As is well known, both sides set no precondition in agreeing on the steps for simultaneous action in New York. We take a serious view on such preconditions put forward by the other party, because it will obviously result in reversing again the agreement. As prescribed in the agreed conclusions, unless all the steps of simultaneous action are implemented fully, all the agreed points will automatically go amiss.

My Government will honestly implement the steps for simultaneous action agreed on recently and make every possible effort to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in a package deal. Our Government's official position was published by the head of the DPRK delegation to the DPRK-United States of America talks. The statement was circulated to delegations of the Conference by my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): I wonder whether this is the proper forum to discuss the bilateral issues among us. However, since my colleague from North

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Korea mentioned something that inevitably affects the situation in my country, I think it is my duty to mention just a couple of points.

First of all, I regret that certain texts are distorted in his statement, mainly the conditions of proceeding with nuclear inspections and the United States-North Korea (otherwise known as DPRK) third round of talks. I must inform this Conference that the exchange of special convoys between South and North Korea and a full-list inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of the North Korean nuclear facilities are the preconditions for proceeding in these matters.

The second point is that I wish to know whether this is the proper forum for discussing these bilateral issues; I humbly ask, Mr. President, that you may be able to make a ruling on this.

Mrs. CARVALHO DE PLASA (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): First of all allow me to express our warmest congratulations to you on taking up the post of President of the Conference. We have every confidence in you and you may be sure you may count on the full cooperation of our delegation. We have asked for the floor to place on record our surprise at the way in which you conducted the part of our meeting which was devoted to the commemoration of International Women's Day. In these times it was unusual.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you for your kind words, and allow me to be surprised at your surprise. I am not really aware of any wrong-doings. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This does not seem to be the case.

I wish to remind you that at our last plenary meeting, on 3 March, it was agreed that I would put to you for approval the recommendation contained in the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/1245, para. 14) concerning the proposed dates for the holding of the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group, i.e. 21-25 March 1994. May I take it that these dates are acceptable to the members of the Conference? This seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

(Mr. Ho, Republic of Korea)

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 17 March 1994, not at 10 o'clock but at 9.30 a.m. - so this is the first change in the flexibility we give to our timetable. The reason for this is that myself as well as my predecessor and my successor have an appointment with the Swiss authorities at 10.30 a.m. so therefore I would like to open this meeting here at 9.30 a.m. So, please note this in your calendars: 9.30 a.m. next Thursday.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CD/PV.675
17 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 17 March 1994 at 9.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany)

GE.94-60695 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 675th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Let me first make some remarks. My presidency is coming to an end. This will be the last plenary session I have the honour to chair and I take this opportunity to make some brief remarks.

First of all, I want to state that presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during the last few weeks, beside the honour associated with this mandate, has given me a good deal of pleasure. I should like to thank all of you for your cooperation and readiness to assist me in situations which have sometimes been difficult. The prevailing spirit of trying to solve problems in a constructive manner has rendered my task easier. I also should like to thank the Secretary-General of our Conference and his collaborators for their efforts.

Despite our intensive efforts, it has not been possible so far to solve the painful problem of expansion of the CD and it is only meagre consolation for me to be in this unfortunate situation with my two predecessors Ambassador Errera and Ambassador Zahran to whom I should like to pay tribute for the outstanding work they accomplished as CD Presidents. I should like to remind colleagues that we need to solve this problem rather soon if we do not want to risk jeopardizing the universal role of the Conference on Disarmament. In this respect, I only can subscribe to the closing remarks of my predecessor, Ambassador Errera, one month ago.

To put it quite bluntly, we are in a deadlock situation. Any formula, any proposal floated in the last weeks, has failed to command consensus within the groups. I cannot however resign myself to this situation which is unbearable to all those States which deservedly aspire to become full-fledged members of this Conference. As we are not even able to agree on the question of a Special Coordinator, to follow up this problem, I feel entitled to use my role as a chairman; and after appropriate consultations I have decided to appoint a Friend of the Chair to deal with this question. I therefore present to you as Friend of the Chair Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil for the membership question. The basis for his endeavour will be the O'Sullivan list but he will of course be open to all other proposals. I thank Ambassador Lampreia for his preparedness to accept this rather thankless task. As I do not really expect Ambassador Lampreia in spite of his abilities to solve the problem of expansion of membership in the remaining days of my presidency, that is to the end of this week, I held consultations with my successors in this office, Ambassadors Boytha of Hungary, Chandra of India and Brotodiningrat of Indonesia who have agreed to accept Ambassador Lampreia as their respective Friend of the Chair. Thus, we will create some continuity in the handling of the membership question. Should we in the meantime be able to agree on a mandate, the status of the Friend of the Chair could be transformed into that of a Special Coordinator.

I have confidence that Ambassador Lampreia will eventually come up with a consensus solution. For my part I will give Ambassador Lampreia any assistance he might need to succeed in his endeavour. I call upon all delegations to cooperate with Ambassador Lampreia with a view to solving this long-standing issue. Does Ambassador Lampreia wish to take the floor? He does, he has the floor.

Mr. LAMPREIA (Brazil): I am honoured by your words and by your confidence in me and in my delegation. You will understand when I say I am reluctant to say that I am grateful, because I am very much conscious of the delicacy and the difficulties involved in this task. I have, however, felt that it is the duty of the Brazilian delegation to accept this designation because we genuinely wish to assist you and the Conference on Disarmament in trying to overcome the impasse we have reached in our consideration of this very relevant issue.

We are moved by our full conviction that in order to preserve the Conference on Disarmament's legitimacy as a negotiating forum and enhance its prospects of achieving significant results, its membership must adequately reflect the new realities of the world. We are also moved by our perception that this understanding is shared by all the members of the Conference and that there is a common wish of reaching an agreement. Of course, agreements require compromises and we are hopeful that delegations can show flexibility in this regard.

I have, if I may add a personal note, gone through the first expansion of the Conference in 1969 and 1970 when we evolved from the original 18 into the 24 and, therefore, I am fully aware of all the pitfalls and all the very complicated situations there are. This is why I think that the only way to try and solve this riddle is to be very much open, very much receptive and that is what I plan to do in accomplishing the task that you have asked me to perform.

We will be receptive to any proposals, procedural or substantive, that fall in line with the basic ideas we have exchanged over the past months. Of course, those ideas are essentially embodied in the report of Ambassador O'Sullivan. Therefore, in concluding these remarks, I can only say that we do look forward to direct consultations with all interested parties and pledge our utmost cooperation in trying to come to a successful solution.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The Conference on Disarmament has been considering the issue of the expansion of its membership for over a decade. Innumerable formulas and proposals have been explored. The Conference continues to arouse great interest among a sizeable number of countries participating as observers. In order to comply with their requests and arrive at a membership better reflecting the new world situation, a Special Coordinator was appointed last year. Following lengthy and intensive consultations with the members of the Conference, the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, achieved positive results. For reasons known to us all, the list of 23 countries submitted in his report last year has not yet been accepted by the Conference. We nurture the hope that it will be accepted in the very near future. In the meantime, my delegation is gratified at

(The President)

the designation of Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair on this issue. The delegation of Mexico interprets the mandate that you have conferred upon him to mean that the list of 23 countries will be respected. The aspirations and, I would add, the right of these countries to join the CD as soon as possible as fully-fledged members have already been recognized by all.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor in this context? I see none. Then I move to the list of speakers for today.

I have on the list of speakers the representatives of the United States of America and Japan. I give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Last July President Clinton extended the United States moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing through September 1994. Last August he stated in a report to the United States Congress that he would decide in 1994 whether to extend the moratorium beyond September. He said that his decision would take into account the status of the CTBT negotiations and the willingness of other nuclear Powers to show reciprocal restraint in forgoing nuclear testing.

The United States continued its moratorium, even after China conducted a nuclear test last 5 October. The President, however, did direct the United States Department of Energy to take such actions as were needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests in 1994, provided our legislative requirements had been met. The President said his decision on whether to test would be based on fundamental United States national security interests, and would take these four factors into account: the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear arsenal in preparation for a CTBT; the extent to which China and others have responded to the United States appeal for a global moratorium on testing; progress in the CTBT negotiations; and finally the implications of further United States nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives.

In accordance with existing United States legislative requirements, the President this month made a report to the Congress, in which he addressed these four points. Regarding the first point, safety and reliability, the report concluded that United States nuclear weapons are safe and reliable. Additional tests could help us prepare for a test ban and could provide for some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, these benefits would be outweighed by the price we would pay in undercutting our own non-proliferation goals. Regarding the second point, the response to our appeal for a global moratorium has been positive, with one exception, the Chinese test in October 1993. The United States will continue to urge China to refrain from further testing.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Regarding the third point, progress in CTBT negotiations, the United States is encouraged by progress to date. The CD has established an ad hoc committee and its two working groups. There have been extensive discussions of substantive issues, and detailed presentations on techniques we will need to consider in reaching decisions on the verification regime. We have discussed the overall structure of the treaty and what elements might be included. And we have begun the important process of tabling and discussing treaty text. There is much yet to do, as we all realize, but my delegation continues to look forward to concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

Regarding the fourth and final point, implications on our broader non-proliferation objectives, the United States continues to believe that a global moratorium on testing will put us in the strongest possible position to negotiate a CTBT, to work for indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in 1995, and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Accordingly, taking all these factors into account, the President has decided to extend the moratorium on United States nuclear testing through September 1995. In this regard, I would like to read for the record a statement by the White House Press Secretary, dated two days ago, 15 March 1994:

> "The President informed Congress yesterday (March 14, 1994) that he was extending the moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States through September 1995.
>
> "The President's decision was based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, weighing the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) against:
>
> -- the restraint the other declared nuclear powers have shown in not responding to China's nuclear test last October with tests of their own;
>
> -- the encouraging progress recorded in the CTB negotiations since they formally opened on January 25;
>
> -- and, the adverse implications further U.S. nuclear tests would have on our broader non-proliferation objectives, including, most notably, our interest in securing the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next year.
>
> "The President will decide next year whether to extend the moratorium beyond September 1995, taking into account the same four factors noted above."

I have asked that the White House statement I just read be circulated as an official CD document.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Ledogar, for this important statement. I have received your document and I have asked the secretariat to duly circulate it. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Today I have taken the floor to express, at this time, Japan's views on the CTBT negotiations.

On 3 February, in the plenary meeting of the CD, I already introduced our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. Since then, two working groups have duly been established and we have entered the phase of serious negotiations on a CTBT by engaging ourselves in discussions and debates on substantive matters. Therefore, my delegation finds it opportune if we can further elaborate our views on a CTBT in the light of what has already been made clear and would be debated in the near future.

Before going to my today's subject, I would like to welcome the decision made by the United States of America to extend the nuclear test moratorium through September 1995 which was announced on 15 March by the White House and was just introduced by Ambassador Ledogar. A right decision was made at a right moment. It will certainly serve favourably to the negotiations on CTBT in the CD.

Let me make clear our basic attitude on a CTBT. The treaty we are negotiating should be universal, and internationally and effectively verifiable. It should also be non-discriminatory, and the adherence not only of the nuclear-weapon States but also of nuclear threshold countries would be crucial to the CTBT. In order to successfully accomplish the negotiations in a prompt way, it would be advisable to take fully into account the CWC, PTBT and other existing treaties and make articles as clear and succinct as possible. The CTBT should establish a truly reliable and a cost-effective verification regime which can systematically benefit from the utilization of already existing facilities and national verification systems as much as possible. In conducting our negotiations, we should not lose sight of the fact that there is a considerable knowledge gap between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States and that both nuclear explosion technologies including those for evasion and verification technologies are of incessantly evolutionary nature. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines but we consider it desirable to be able to reach a stage, by spring 1995, where we can have a prospect of a successful conclusion of the treaty negotiations at hand.

Now let me turn to the contents of the treaty on which we are negotiating. First, I would like to make it clear that the purpose of the treaty is twofold: nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. We cannot accept a choice of either of them. Both form the ultimate goal of the treaty.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Second, the scope of the treaty should be total prohibition of any nuclear explosion in any environment without any exception. With regard to its preparation, the word "prevent" means, in our view, that the State party should ensure the prohibition of the preparation of any nuclear explosions by natural or legal persons, so we can dissipate our concern over the preparation for an imminent test by using the word "prevent", as in the case of PTBT. It will also be possible to set a clause, according to which consultation or clarification can be sought by any State party in case a doubtful situation emerges.

Third, a definition clause is not necessary, we are of the opinion that by today the concept of a nuclear explosion has been more or less established. Discussion on definition may only lead our negotiations into an endless circuit. On the other hand, it should be made clear that any State party should not be hampered from promoting research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are not designed to be released in an uncontrolled way. Concerning the obligations imposed on States parties to prohibit natural or legal persons' activities of certain categories, the CTBT should take the approach of enumerating each activity of natural or legal persons to be prohibited. Otherwise, the contents of prohibition regarding natural or legal persons will become less clear and the States parties will have difficulty in setting those obligations in the form of national legislation.

Fourth, the duration of the treaty should be indefinite.

Fifth, as for compliance and settlement of disputes, we can follow the examples set forth in articles 9, 12 and 14 of the CWC and establish relevant articles on clarification, consultation, procedures of settlement of disputes, and the involvement of the United Nations Security Council.

Sixth, on verification. Whether the forthcoming CTBT will be a worthy one or not, it all depends on the verification system. Verification of a nuclear explosion is a relatively easy task but at the same time no single verification means is perfect to detect all those explosions. Yet, we can anticipate steady technological progress in the field of verification so that in the future more exhaustive types of verification system can be introduced. Therefore, a realistic verification system can be envisaged in a form of a package of different verification means with a possible introduction, in the future, of more advanced and efficient means. Seismological verification network forms the core of the verification system. The pressing question is how to transform the GSETT-3 experiment into the reliable verification system of the CTBT, as well as to ensure the successful implementation of GSETT-3 as is originally planned.

In considering the monitoring of radionuclides, the existing monitoring system implemented by IAEA, WHO, UNEP and others, as well as radionuclide monitoring conducted by many countries should be first evaluated fully.

With regard to on-site inspection, only a kind of challenge inspection, the naming of which may necessitate further consideration, should be considered.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

This inspection will be triggered off when a member State party suspects a possible nuclear explosion and its request for on-site inspection is approved by the organization. The training of inspectors will be conducted by States parties either independently or within a framework of bilateral cooperation and the organization will keep lists of inspectors presented by each State party. At the same time, the possibility of using IAEA inspectors may be addressed.

For the sake of economy on verification system and also of the need to keep the military classified information, it would be wise to make as much use as possible of national technical means, including hydroacoustic means, satellites and others.

Seventh, the organization will be composed of a conference of States parties, a secretariat and an international data centre. The need to establish an executive council will be made clear only after we come to know how frequently the conference of the States parties can meet.

The secretariat should be of small size. In principle, the analysis and evaluation of data and information collected by the monitoring system or presented by States parties should be met by each State party. But the secretariat can be involved in the analysis and evaluation of data and information so long as this function will not necessitate unwieldy enlargement of the secretariat.

Eighth: entry into force. I have already addressed our view on the question in Working Group II. The CTBT, once it is established, should enter into force as soon as possible. It is very important that all the nuclear-weapon countries adhere to it and all the nuclear-capable countries become States parties to it. But it doesn't seem wise at this present time to admit to give any country or countries a power of veto. We think we can approach this question from a numerical point of view, for example 30 countries, but this question should be elaborated further by engaging ourselves in more detailed and thorough discussions.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ambassador Tanaka, for this very valuable contribution. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to Iran and then to the United Kingdom.

Mr. BAIDI-NEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran): As this is the first time my delegation takes the floor under your presidency, I would like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me express the full satisfaction of my delegation at the manner you guided our work in the Conference. I will seize the opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Errera of France, for his tireless efforts in conducting the work of the Conference in the best manner.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

Pursuant to the proposal made by my delegation at the CD plenary on 10 February 1994 regarding the expansion of membership of the Conference on Disarmament, in order to make the proposal more concrete and illustrative, I would suggest that the Conference takes the following decision on its expansion. First, the Conference on Disarmament decides that the following countries join the Conference as new members as of 16 May 1994: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. Second, the Conference will consider the application for membership of the following States with a view to an early and appropriate decision: Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, Portugal, Slovenia and Tunisia.

The Friend of the Chair on the question of expansion, the Ambassador of Brazil, who was just appointed by you, and whom I congratulate on his appointment, during his consultations with the member States, will explore the ways and means to implement this decision and report to the Conference before the end of its 1994 session.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for this proposal. I am sure you will hand it in to the secretariat so that we can distribute it. Now I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): For the record I would just like to say that the United Kingdom does not share the personal interpretation of the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico of the task given to Ambassador Lampreia, whom I congratulate and thank, with whom I commiserate and to whom I pledge my delegation's full support. In our view, the task should be as stated by you this morning, to be open to all proposals that have been made on this subject, and among those I would certainly include the proposal we have just listened to from the distinguished representative of Iran, and not just that of Ambassador O'Sullivan. It is still the preference of the United Kingdom that all those States who had applied for membership by last September should be admitted to the Conference.

Mr. DUBOIS (Canada) (translated from French): Simply on this question of expansion I wanted first of all to express full support for your initiative to designate a Friend of the Chair as a very desirable alternative to enable us to continue to consider this thorny issue. Secondly, I would like to reiterate my delegation's support for the way in which you briefly defined the tasks which await Ambassador Lampreia as a Friend of the Chair, namely, to use the O'Sullivan list as a basis and any other proposal which may be made. And in that context I just wanted to repeat, inter alia, the proposal as advanced by my delegation some time ago, namely, that expansion should include any State which has made an application for admission, which has requested admission to the Conference, at a specific date, a date that has yet to be determined. We also wish to assure

(Mr. Baidi-Nejad, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Ambassador Lampreia of our full cooperation in his highly sensitive and political task.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me first of all, even though this is the last occasion on which you will be presiding over our work, to congratulate you and extend our gratitude to you and to your delegation for the manner in which you have discharged your duties in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. The item on the expansion of this Conference has been before us for some time, and we note with regret that at the end of your term as President and despite the steps you have taken, added to those of your predecessors, the matter is still without a solution, although the Conference was so close to one some months ago last summer. We should also like to associate ourselves with those who have commended your initiative to designate a Friend of the Chair to continue consultations to find a solution to this matter, and we consider that in this decision you could not have made a wiser choice than the designation of the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, Ambassador Lampreia, to whom we pledge our cooperation as of now.

We have stated on other occasions, when the problem of expansion was considered, that our country supports the list offered to us by Ambassador O'Sullivan as a solution and almost unanimously accepted by this Conference. The support we give to this list does not derive simply from sympathy for the ceaseless efforts made by Ambassador O'Sullivan, or his personality, although he would on both accounts deserve it. It is derived basically because we understand that the balance and proportion stemming from the list proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan are truly the only way out which will satisfy the interests represented at this Conference so as to be able to solve the problem of expansion of this forum, and I would like to extend the sympathy of our delegation to those observer delegations that have so patiently witnessed and become aware of and followed our hesitations regarding the solution to this matter. It is my understanding, like that of the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, that seeking a solution based on the list of the proposal by Ambassador O'Sullivan will be the main task of the distinguished Ambassador Lampreia, your Friend for this difficult task.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your friendly words and for your contribution. Does anyone else wish to take the floor? If this is not the case let me now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

(Mrs. Bauta Soles, Cuba)

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.20 a.m.

CD/PV.676
24 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 March 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. György Boytha (Hungary)

GE.94-60950 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 676th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It has become my turn and honour to assume the presidency of the Conference. I am supposed to have the Chair for a rather long period and to cooperate with you as President until the end of May. This period of presidency covers the two last weeks of the first period of our session and the two first weeks of the next session; in between we shall have an inter-sessional period, too. I wish to thank you in advance for your cooperation and I wish to pledge that I shall do my best to be of assistance to you in order to develop your own ideas. I consider my task to be that of catalysing the development of collective wisdom and I shall try to channel the discussions in a way so that all of you can contribute to the outcome which is hoped for this ongoing session. My work has been made a lot easier by the efficient work performed by my predecessors and I wish to thank from the Chair Ambassador Errera and Ambassador Hoffmann for the work they have done. In actual fact, the work of the ad hoc committees has started and is going on in a businesslike manner; there seems to be no problem in this regard. The Special Coordinators, Ambassadors Norberg and Shannon, have already started their consultations on the cut-off of production of fissile material and the agenda, respectively, and we hope that they shall report to us in one of the forthcoming meetings already. There is one serious problem which we have to face and this is the unsolved question of the expansion of the membership of the CD. In this respect, I have it also somewhat easier than my predecessors, because Ambassador Hoffmann, with the agreement of both Ambassador Errera and myself, has appointed without any objection on your part, as a Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil. I wish to confirm his appointment on my part and I should like to ask him to help me by doing his best in order to find a way out of the impasse concerning the expansion of our membership. I also shall do my best to help him and we shall try to improve the situation also by looking for further possibilities to frame, to cast an acceptable mandate which has not been considered so far and to "upgrade" his status as Friend of the Chair to that of a Special Coordinator. Whether we shall have success to this end is an open question but we should strive to find a solution because we are under pressure of time.

The current activities of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be conceived as "conducting business as usual". The Conference has seized the historic opportunity to negotiate a comprehensive and global ban on nuclear testing. The international community had to wait a long time for these talks to begin, yet the intensity of the work carried on in this domain indicates a genuine interest to find solutions to the political and technical problems that have to be faced. The well-structured discussions on the possible contents of a treaty are very substantial and promising. There, of course, remains a lot to be done before a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty can be concluded.

(The President)

The time allocated to the negotiations on a nuclear test ban clearly indicates the importance attached by the Conference to this item of our agenda. Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of other items of the agenda that are hardly less important to address. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, I cannot fail to underline the significance attached to the question of increasing transparency related to military matters. Not only am I honoured by assuming the presidency of this important subsidiary body of the Conference, but I also feel professional satisfaction in attempting to fulfil my duties in this regard. I am personally convinced that transparency in armaments is a topic of the multilateral disarmament and security forums that should continue to get the attention it requires. It cannot be contested that transparency in armaments, if appropriately pursued, can become a major element of security equations both in a global and regional sense, and in this context I thank already those distinguished members who have made pertinent statements in the course of discussions we had so far.

The fact that I do not touch upon other issues considered currently in the Conference on Disarmament does not mean a lack of interest on my part. Rather, it indicates a wish to spare our time for substantive contributions of member States. In conclusion, let me reiterate that I count on your support in the same spirit of cooperation we had the opportunity to witness during the first two months of the 1994 session. In this context I also wish to express my thanks for the work that has been done so far by the secretariat, in particular for the authority offered to us by the Secretary-General, His Excellency Vladimir Petrovsky, and the assistance of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Bensmail, and I ask the secretariat to help us also in the future in the forthcoming part of our work.

This having been said now, we have to turn to our substantive work. I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Algeria, Egypt, Japan, Switzerland, China, New Zealand and Sweden. I give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that your abilities as a diplomat and your experience will make a very efficient contribution to the work of our Conference. The words you have just spoken are encouraging for us. I can assure you of the full cooperation of the Algerian delegation. I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, who guided our previous work with great success. I also welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia.

I should like to speak to the question of the nuclear test ban. My delegation reaffirms the relevance of the recommendations and views expressed in Group of 21 documents CD/1231 of 11 February 1994 and CD/1252 of 23 March 1994, which set out a general approach that we share. I would, however, like to add a

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few comments which the Algerian delegation will clarify further in the course of the negotiations.

For the time being, the positive impression that we have of the negotiations under way has been tempered somewhat by statements made here and there in support of particular rights to be reserved to certain Powers. We would say that our concern for a rapid and positive outcome to the negotiations could not lead us to accept the reproduction of a situation of inequality. We believe that the majority of States place the test ban in the perspective of universal, general and complete nuclear disarmament. It would therefore be a mistake to believe that some States could be accorded the right to retain indefinitely a monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons.

I should now like to turn to certain aspects of the treaty. First of all its general characteristics. The test-ban treaty must be universal, non-discriminatory and open to signature by all States and should include no clause favouring any of the signatory parties in any manner, shape or form. As to the definition of tests, the wording in the partial test-ban Treaty, although imperfect, offers a sufficient basis. It does leave open a doubt as to nuclear explosions that do not have the status of military tests, which it seems to cover, but it has the merit of avoiding the attempt to reach a consensus, which would be very difficult to achieve, on greater precision. As to the scope of application of the ban, the treaty should ban all tests of nuclear explosives everywhere.

Let us take a closer look at some of the aspects of the scope of application. The ban should cover preparatory activities, even if this ban raises difficulties in terms of verification, because verification should not serve only to allow the recording of a violation of an international commitment, but also to prevent it. A single test would imperil the balance created by the treaty. Under the existing system of international relations, detecting preparatory activities conducted by a permanent member country of the Security Council, for example, could lead to diplomatic actions designed to dissuade it from carrying out a test; a posteriori notification that such a State had carried out a nuclear test would be pointless. The ban should not be tied to any particular yield threshold. It is true that this ambitious objective will pose major verification problems, because it is always possible to envisage a situation in which some low-intensity explosions might not be detected. However, above and beyond the general commitment of States to act in good faith in applying rules accepted in a sovereign manner, a verification regime that benefited from the development of technologies would one day detect any violations of the treaty.

As to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, we are waiting for convincing and scientifically well-founded explanations to prove that a ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by means of a treaty is absolutely necessary, that it does not block potentialities for economic and social

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development, and that it could be uniformly respected. The fact that it is impossible to distinguish between two possible uses arising from a scientific discovery has never previously been judged sufficient to justify a halt to experiments in any particular area. Is it possible, without an in-depth discussion on this subject and without an adequate exchange of knowledge and findings drawn from explosions for peaceful purposes conducted previously, to decide in a treaty that they will henceforth be unlawful? Posing this question in no way diminishes our commitment to finding a consensus on banning such explosions. As to simulations, we would certainly prefer to have them banned. But we know that such a ban would be unreliable in the absence of means of verification. We also know that a ban without appropriate verification machinery is dangerous for the general balance of the treaty and its viability: banning simulations without having means of verification might imperil the entire proliferation system. As to safety tests, maintaining such a "right" for certain nuclear Powers would make nonsense of the commitment to a complete and universal test ban. Moreover, it would once again start up a sterile debate on the purpose of the international non-proliferation regime as a whole. What would be the justification for a new unequal regime? What viability would it have?

As to the verification system, the objective to be set as regards verification affects the entirety of the system to be established. We think we should not limit ourselves to simply recording violations or reacting a posteriori, but as far as possible we should try to prevent them. Monitoring of sites is a means of prevention. On the other hand, we must not seek perfection in advance, but devise machinery capable of continuous improvement. The clauses of the treaty should not, however, automatically depend on verification, otherwise they will be constantly called into question by technological developments. The verification system must be non-discriminatory. This means that it will be based on a single set of rules in terms of rights and duties for all the signatories. This system should complement and reinforce the arrangements currently in force, or those to be put into effect in the future, and not constitute a parallel system. The best possible use must be made of all existing international verification machinery in order to limit costs.

Quite clearly, the scope and verification aspects are very closely associated. We are under no illusions as to how the future verification system will be applied: the countries that have the means to observe preparations are the same ones that have surveillance capabilities. They are also the ones that might be tempted to carry out safety tests.

The costs incurred in connection with inspections should follow the pattern stipulated under the chemical weapons Convention: they will be borne by the organization for routine inspections, and by the State requesting them for challenge inspections. We have no preference for any particular means of verification, provided that it is universally and uniformly applied. Seismic monitoring and the detection of radionuclides seem the best-known and

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best-understood means. Why not start building the notification system around these two methods?

Training and access to technology: no clause should be interpreted as limiting the right of States to acquire nuclear facilities and technologies for peaceful use. This is not simply a rhetorical claim - for many dual-use technologies the developed countries find it normal to apply a double standard based on the relations they have with the recipient State rather than its real objectives. The universal nature of the right to development must be taken into account.

To enhance the verification system, its universality and its non-discriminatory nature, verification techniques and procedures which are currently known only to some Powers must be made more widely known, on the pattern of what has happened with the Convention on chemical weapons. Standardization of methods of interpreting recorded signals makes this essential. This would enhance the verification system as a whole.

While recognizing the relevance of the discussion of who will be responsible for verification of the future treaty, we tend to favour more rational use of the resources already available. We will not oppose any consensus that may emerge on the creation of an autonomous body which would draw on the experience of IAEA, for example. However, cost must remain a constant concern. Should a new organization be created, we believe that it would be a good idea for it to follow the structure suggested for the chemical weapons organization, in other words a conference of States parties and an executive council set up on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.

The system of analysis for seismic or non-seismic phenomena should be neither centralized nor monopolized by a limited number of States. All States parties should have access to the same information.

As to the duration of the treaty, it must be unlimited in time but contain machinery for periodic review. As to entry into force, the constraints of the future treaty necessitate accession by as many States as possible before it enters into force. All the proposals that we have heard so far involve limits. In particular, there is no link between entry into force and the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. The suggestion made by the Russian delegation - accession by States with nuclear power stations and reactors - is noteworthy: it is easy to count and identify these States. However, most countries which possess nuclear reactors accept the surveillance machinery of IAEA. Would the general system of non-proliferation really be strengthened if the entry into force of the treaty were dependent on ratification by these States alone? In any event, we consider that ratification of the treaty by the nuclear States is essential for its entry into force. We could associate ourselves with the reproduction of the formula taken from the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would allow entry into force before ratification of the treaty by all States. As was

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shown by the pull-along effect during the final phase of negotiation of the Convention banning chemical weapons, national declarations could play an important role when the negotiation and drafting of the treaty have reached a sufficiently advanced level. As to sanctions, the treaty should contain provision for sanctions against States parties which violate their treaty obligations. However, in keeping with the principles of equality and non-discrimination on which this treaty should be based, we feel that these sanctions should be provided for in the body of the treaty itself. The idea of expressly contemplating sanctions against States which do not sign the convention seems to us indefensible. It violates numerous principles, including that of sovereignty, and would constitute a disastrous precedent in international relations. We would prefer the idea of incentives to sign.

Turning to links with other international treaties, the future treaty is simply one element in the general non-proliferation system. There is an undeniable interdependence between all international instruments relating to disarmament. Except in so far as we must avoid all discrepancies between commitments made under the future treaty and other multilateral instruments, there would be no point in attempting to reproduce imbalances in rights and obligations which, under the pretext of stability, aim at perpetuating existing situations. As to withdrawal clauses, we believe that no clause in the treaty should be capable of being interpreted as entitling a State party to denounce the treaty, and hence to carry out tests, and hence to call into question the entire international non-proliferation system, and hence - finally - to imperil the security of the other members of the international community.

Before concluding, I should like to state our conviction that we must start drafting the treaty as rapidly as possible. We will shortly arrive at a critical deadline concerning the entire present system of nuclear non-proliferation. The negotiations under way on the nuclear-test-ban treaty, like those which we hope will shortly be carried out on the issues of negative security assurances or on the production of fissile material, in fact constitute a foundation for the work of the NPT review conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Algeria for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I would like at the outset to congratulate you on behalf of the Egyptian delegation on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your wide diplomatic experience and personal qualities will effectively contribute to the success of our work. I would like also to avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation in achieving the

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desired success of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the objectives to which we are aspiring, particularly the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

On 10 March, I delivered before the meeting of the CD a statement which outlined Egypt's position on the issue of transparency in armaments. And today, prior to the conclusion of the first part of the CD session of 1994, I was keen to define our position on the nuclear items on our agenda being given priority by the CD this year.

Our meeting here reflects a general consensus on the need to protect mankind from the ravages of weapons of mass destruction, weapons which cannot ensure the absolute security of any State. We must therefore pool our efforts with a view to elaborating more effective means to ensure real collective security, primarily through the conclusion of additional disarmament treaties and instruments and by setting up appropriate monitoring and verification mechanisms to ensure compliance with their provisions in the light of the improved international relations which characterize the post-cold-war period. With this in mind I would like today to address some of the important issues which the CD is currently dealing with. Prominent among them is the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, an issue to which we all attribute high priority and which has become the most important issue currently being negotiated in the CD. I will also deal with Egypt's position on an issue of high priority for us, namely security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, in addition to a new item that we have agreed to include on our agenda, namely a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes.

With respect to the basic obligations of the comprehensive test-ban treaty which we are currently negotiating, and the elements that we believe should be reflected in the provisions of the treaty, as we have previously stated in our interventions before the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, under the capable chairmanship of our colleague and friend Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, our position is as follows: first, the treaty must prohibit all forms of nuclear test in all environments, whether in the atmosphere, under water or underground, without any distinction among member States.

Second, the treaty should not be viewed merely as a symbol of an international instrument to promote non-proliferation but must be considered as a step leading to the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Third, the treaty must contain provisions which ban any activities likely to encourage, assist or provide an appropriate environment for carrying out nuclear tests, including preparatory activities for such tests.

Fourth, the treaty should not set any threshold and must also avert the possibility of improving or modernizing existing nuclear weapons in the possession of some States.

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Fifth, the ban must encompass all nuclear tests, even those that are allegedly peaceful, so as to prevent any future military benefits being derived from such tests.

Sixth, the verification mechanism under the treaty must be of universal application, non-discriminatory and subject to international monitoring. It must also be technically effective, and we are therefore eager to learn about all possible forms of verification, whether seismic or non-seismic and on-site, while following a sophisticated approach which allows for benefits to be derived from any technological advances in this field whenever possible.

Seventh, the basic objective of considering the creation of an international institution to supervise the application of the provisions of the comprehensive test-ban treaty is to ensure monitoring of compliance with its provisions. We therefore believe that it is important that this institution should be neutral, of an international nature and provided with advanced technical capabilities tailored to the responsibilities attributed to it, especially verification activities. The cost must be appropriate, without imposing a heavy additional financial burden on member States, and currently existing mechanisms should be used whenever possible. The institution should comprise an executive body which represents member States and which effectively carries out its international responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the treaty's provisions.

Eighth, the treaty should be universal and include all States and primarily the five permanent member States of the Security Council, in addition to all other States that possess nuclear weapons without exception, as well as an adequate number of other member States to be agreed upon so that the treaty may enter into force at the earliest possible time.

Before moving on to another subject, I would not want to miss the opportunity to welcome the decision by the United States Government on 15 March last to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing to September 1995. We call on all nuclear-weapon States and all threshold States to follow the same approach and to freeze those tests voluntarily until the entry into force of the treaty currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an approach will have a positive impact on our negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Egypt attributes great importance to the issue of concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We consider that the most effective guarantee in this field is the total elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. Naturally, we realize that the achievement of this objective will require some time, and therefore pending its attainment security assurances represent an essential interim requirement for all non-nuclear States. They are also of vital importance in reassuring non-nuclear-weapon States and their peoples and in convincing them not to enter into an arms race to acquire

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similar or alternative types of weapon for purposes of deterrence. Such guarantees will also allow non-nuclear-weapon States to mobilize their human, financial and natural resources for comprehensive economic and social development conducive to the welfare of their peoples in an atmosphere of peace and security. We believe that security assurances in favour of non-nuclear States are a legitimate right of those States. These security assurances should not be conditional, limited or of restricted application. We also believe that those security assurances should be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character and that its provisions should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, namely the Conference on Disarmament.

The envisaged treaty should also include clear and credible commitments that take into consideration the security-related fears of developing countries, particularly in view of the fact that equality of rights and obligations is not observed between States that pursue ambiguous nuclear policies, refuse to place all their nuclear facilities under international control and decline to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, such as Israel in the Middle East, and States that have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option. Furthermore, the envisaged treaty should clearly indicate that its ultimate objective is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons from our planet and from outer space. We believe that the conclusion of an international treaty in this field would be an important step that should lead to a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, including alleged self-defence. The provision to this effect in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty has not been applied during the last 25 years.

The delegation of Egypt believes, like many member countries of the Conference, that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances should not be confined to addressing negative security assurances but should also extend to the discussion of all the negative and positive aspects of security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States, especially as the title of this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

It is our view that, given the failure of the NPT to provide adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, the ultimate goal of this Ad Hoc Committee should be to formulate a comprehensive and legally binding instrument to provide such security assurances to the countries that have rejected voluntarily both the nuclear option and the possession of nuclear arms. It is therefore logical that such an instrument should replace the current inadequate mechanisms such as Security Council resolution 255, which addresses only positive security assurances in a non-coherent manner that has been rendered outdated by the new realities that dominate the international environment, or the unilateral or multilateral declarations issued by the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which are not of a legally binding nature, could be withdrawn at any time and cannot in themselves form a reliable and sound basis on which to build confidence

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and guarantee the security of countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. Against this background the Egyptian delegation wishes to reaffirm the importance of formulating, within the framework of that Committee, a legally binding treaty that includes the following key elements:

First, a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which are (a) States parties to the NPT, (b) States parties to regional conventions establishing zones free of nuclear weapons, (c) States parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA;

Second, the inherent right of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain negative as well as positive comprehensive security assurances within the framework of the treaty;

Third, reference should also be made to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which permits the use of force against an aggressor and the imposition of sanctions and coercive measures by the Security Council in the event of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State;

Fourth, the treaty should also embody a clear definition of the assistance that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to receive if they are subjected to nuclear attack or a threat of aggression by nuclear weapons. Such assistance should include technical, scientific, financial and humanitarian aspects. The non-nuclear-weapon States should also be entitled to receive full compensation for the human and material losses that they suffer as a result of such aggression.

In our view, the provision of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States through the conclusion of a separate international treaty is the best available option. However, in the light of the ongoing divergence of opinions in the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee regarding this issue, it may be advisable, since we are approaching the date of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, to examine the possibility of requesting the NPT conference Preparatory Committee to prepare an additional protocol to the Treaty that includes comprehensive security assurances in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States which would be adopted as an annex to the NPT at the 1995 conference pending consideration of its extended application.

At this juncture I would like to reiterate the position of Egypt that I have previously mentioned in the Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear security assurances, namely that our final position on the extension of the NPT will ultimately depend on the progress achieved towards an international treaty that provides the requisite security assurances in favour of non-nuclear States as well as the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

For the first time this year the issue of banning the production of fissile material for military purposes was included on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Egyptian delegation has already had an opportunity to welcome this development in principle in a statement delivered before the plenary meeting of the CD on 27 January 1994 at the beginning of this session. The Egyptian delegation welcomes today the appointment of Ambassador Gerald Shannon, the Permanent Representative of Canada, as Special Coordinator of the Conference on this issue, and I wish to assure Ambassador Shannon of the full cooperation of the Egyptian delegation in ensuring the success of his critical mission. We look forward to further consultations with him on this matter either bilaterally or in regional groups, particularly the Group of 21, and we will be happy to meet him with the Group. We think that Ambassador Shannon, as Special Coordinator, should organize informal meetings open to all the members of this Conference in order to discuss the dimensions of this issue, ways to deal with it, and its connection with other items on the agenda, especially the nuclear items.

The idea of banning the production of fissile material for military purposes is undoubtedly a positive step that will guide us towards the objective to which we are all aspiring, namely, the realization of non-proliferation pending full nuclear disarmament. We have certain reservations, however, on the wisdom of confining our endeavours to banning only the production of additional fissile material, since declared nuclear-weapon States and also some other non-declared States possess dangerous technology which permits dual uses, as well as a large stockpile of such materials which are being or could be used for the production of missiles and nuclear bombs. Consequently, the Egyptian delegation believes that, when embarking on a study of a ban on the production of those materials, we must extend our efforts and consultations to include the compilation of an inventory of existing fissile material which could be used by any State for military purposes with a view to banning existing stockpiles of such material in addition to prohibiting any further production thereof. Such an approach would add a large degree of transparency with respect to all categories of arms including weapons of mass destruction, particularly the most destructive among them, pending a timely political decision to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and to dismantle them in order to protect mankind and save our environment from destruction and annihilation. It is noteworthy that the international community has prohibited some conventional and highly injurious weapons under the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was concluded on the initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. One of the principal characteristics of international humanitarian law is that the use of such weapons constitutes a crime against humanity. It is only reasonable, therefore, that we should prohibit the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction, including the most destructive, namely, nuclear weapons, which could result in the total annihilation of the human race.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Finally, concerning the issue of expanding the membership of the Conference, the Egyptian delegation wishes to welcome the appointment of the Permanent Representative of Brazil, Ambassador Luiz Felipe Lampreia, as a Friend of the Chair. We would have preferred him to assume the responsibility of Special Coordinator on this important issue from the very beginning, in order to find an acceptable solution to the expansion of membership so that the composition of the Conference would reflect the increase in the membership of the United Nations since the establishment of the Conference in 1979, as well as the new balance of power in the international community since the end of the cold war. The Egyptian delegation holds the view that, despite the fact that the formula proposed by the previous Special Coordinator, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, commanded near-unanimity, except for the objection of one or two countries to the membership of one or two States which applied for membership of the Conference, this situation should not prevent accession to full CD membership of other candidate countries so that they can participate on an equal footing with the other member States in the negotiation of the international instruments that are accorded priority on the Conference agenda. Within this framework, while welcoming the Mexican initiative, we believe that the efforts of Ambassador Lampreia should not be confined solely to the formula proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan. He should be given an opportunity to hold consultations on any other formula that might offer a basis for consensus. In this regard, I am ready, as a former President of the Conference, to furnish Ambassador Lampreia with the detailed result of my consultations as well as the various formulas which I examined with members and non-members of the Conference from August 1993 until January 1994. I wish him every success in his endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words of support expressed with regard to our work. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Let me at the outset congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference when it addresses important issues for the international community and assure you of our full cooperation.

I have taken the floor today to report to the Conference on the Tokyo Workshop on CTB verification held last week. The Government of Japan hosted a workshop on CTB verification from Monday 14 to Wednesday 16 March, aiming at identifying problems of CTB verification based primarily on seismological methods and trying to seek ways to cope with them in order to promote the CTBT negotiations, and acquainting the workshop participants with Japanese seismic monitoring technologies which could be applicable to the international seismic monitoring system (ISMS).

A total of 38 experts and officials from 24 countries, i.e. Australia, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States actively participated in the discussions, briefings and demonstrations held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Meteorological Agency. In the plenary meeting where both seismologists and officials in charge of CTBT negotiations were present, they discussed the issues of effectiveness of seismological verification technologies, estimated cost of seismological verification, operation of a seismological verification system in a CTB, and means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Netherlands, the United States, Norway and Australia, whose representatives made presentations on the four issues respectively, and other participant countries for the comments which their representatives made.

Although the discussions were held in an informal manner to encourage the participants as qualified individuals to exchange their views freely, with no aim of adopting a final document or a report of conclusions, the Japanese delegation feels it may be useful to highlight for the Conference some of the interesting points raised in the workshop.

With respect to "effectiveness of seismological verification technologies", among the important questions addressed in the workshop were such questions as how one could identify a possible nuclear explosion out of so many seismic events taking place every day and who should be responsible for conducting such a task. A reply given in the workshop was that while the ultimate responsibility for the identification work might rest with the national data centre of each State party to the CTBT, the international data centre could do significant work and that the room left for the final judgement of the national authority might be relatively limited. In this connection it was pointed out that the IDC would expeditiously publish seismic bulletins which would include information on the origin time, the location, the depth, the body and surface wave magnitudes of the seismic events detected by the monitoring network, and would keep all relevant information on seismic waves, and that the identification work might be greatly facilitated by such information made available by the IDC. If a seismic event is located at the bottom of the ocean or in a highly populated area, it is unlikely that it was a nuclear explosion. If the epicentre is found to be deeper than 10 kilometres, the event is probably a natural earthquake. The ratio of the body and surface wave magnitudes and the pattern of the wave-form will make a decisive contribution to identifying whether the seismic event in question is a natural earthquake or not. Though it may be difficult for the IDC to give a final analysis on all seismic events, it was argued in the workshop that it would be useful to agree to the procedure with which the IDC would group all seismic data into two categories, namely those which indicate that the event in question is a natural phenomenon and those which raise a doubt that a nuclear explosion may have occurred.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

As for "estimated cost of seismological verification", cost estimates for GSETT-3 were given. It was stated that the overall annual operational costs for GSETT-3 might be US$ 30 million, as the communication costs could be as high as $12 million, and a suggestion was made to consider exemption or reduction of local tariffs to cut significantly the communications costs. No doubt these figures will provide an important basis for the consideration of a future CTBT verification system. Some of the issues which require decisions of a political nature will be how these costs should be borne among the CTBT organization and States parties, and whether we need to consider making a special fund in the future organization.

With respect to "means to supplement seismological verification for a CTB", the participants were reminded of the valuable CD papers including a questionnaire which had already been circulated in the verification Working Group.

And last but not least, the Japan Meterological Agency showed the participants the automated seismic detection system already in operation in Japan. The Agency completely opened to the seismic experts the program of a fully automated method for detecting the arrival times of seismic waves and its application to an on-line processing system, providing them with the papers and floppy disks on the theory with the formulae, diagrams, tables, charts, etc. Japan believes that this method can substantially contribute to the formation of a reliable and cost-effective CTBT verification system.

In conclusion, the Japanese delegation hopes that the Tokyo workshop has given additional food for thought to the participant countries and will make some contribution to the important CTBT negotiations under way here in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Moser.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with pleasure that I take the floor while you are presiding over the work of this Conference. Your proven diplomatic skills and your abilities as a fine negotiator offer the Conference guarantees for success in its deliberations and will not only be an effective contribution to the advancement of the Conference's work but will also be decisive for the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Allow me also to address the gratitude of the Swiss delegation to the German delegation as well as to the French delegation and to restate our esteem for the exemplary way in which they discharged their functions while presiding over the Conference for the last two terms. I take this opportunity to address our greetings to our new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and the new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, as well as the members of their secretariat.

My Government notes with pleasure that this session of the Conference has commenced in a very positive manner and that organizational matters have been settled in a spirit that has shown the keen interest of these members in addressing questions of substance rapidly. My country is glad that clear priorities have been established to embark on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also welcome the fact that a Special Coordinator has been appointed for the question of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and we hope that the consultations now under way will rapidly lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate.

As the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty have begun, my Government learnt with particularly great satisfaction of the decision of the President of the United States to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing in his country until September next year. We welcome this initiative and hope that it will be followed by the other nuclear Powers. The joint observance of a moratorium will doubtless enable the Conference to make substantial progress this year in the negotiations it has just begun.

With regard to the content of the future treaty, I would like to be able to come back to this at a later stage. Today I would just like to say that it is of the greatest importance for my Government that this treaty should be negotiated in a multilateral forum, that it should be universal and non-discriminatory and that it should be accompanied by an effective system of international verification. Allow me to emphasize yet again how happy my Government is that your Conference is preparing to deal resolutely with this question, which has been under discussion for many years, and that at the same time and in the same spirit it is dealing with a number of other matters that could promote a favourable climate on the eve of the review conference on the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. The momentum acquired over recent weeks augurs well and encourages us to look forward to the vital deadline next year in New York with a degree of optimism.

(Mr. Moser, Switzerland)

Allow me to add that my country is also very alive to another subject on your agenda. I am referring to transparency in conventional arms, which my country considers to be another pillar in the future work of this Conference. Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands reminded us with a great deal of clarity in his statement on 24 February of the role that has devolved on the Conference and the contribution expected of it in order to strengthen confidence-building measures which can be seen to be more necessary and more urgent every day. The treatment of this question will also be followed by my country with sustained interest.

As you know, my country has put its name forward for full membership of the Conference. The Swiss Government cannot but regret that the question of expansion is still in abeyance, despite the tireless efforts that have been made over the last few months, for which we would like to express our deep gratitude, to you and your predecessors, particularly Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, Ambassador Errera of France and Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express also our profound appreciation to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, who has recently been recalled for important duties in his capital. Having spared no effort as Special Coordinator on the question of expansion, Ambassador O'Sullivan proposed a solution that generally speaking was welcomed as being intelligent, balanced and fully in keeping with the credibility of the Conference. I noted with satisfaction Ambassador Hoffmann's appeal to the Conference when he took up the Chair, which you have just repeated today, Mr. President, to settle this question as soon as possible and thus be able to play fully its role as a universal negotiating body. The appointment of Ambassador Lampreia as a Friend of the Chair seems to be a step in the right direction. In concluding these brief remarks I would like to reiterate my country's profound attachment to the Conference on Disarmament. Above and beyond our interest in the substance of your work, I can confirm that intense efforts are currently being made by my authorities in order to give the members of the Conference complete satisfaction on the issue of the status of its representatives in Geneva. Köszönöm szépen.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your statement and for your words that were not only very kind, but also expressed in Hungarian.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Hou.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, first of all I would like to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am confident that your extraordinary ability and rich experience as a seasoned diplomat will help bring new progress to the work of this Conference. Allow me to pledge to you and all other delegations the continued close cooperation of the

(Mr. Hou, China)

Chinese delegation. I would also like to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, for his outstanding contributions. Since I am taking the floor for the first time at this session, allow me to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Petrovsky's profound knowledge of international political and disarmament affairs and his extensive experience are invaluable assets to all of us. I also take great pleasure in offering my congratulations to Mr. Bensmail on his promotion to be Deputy Secretary-General of the CD and head of the Geneva branch of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. I would also like to associate myself with the warm welcome expressed by other speakers to the distinguished Ambassadors who recently took up their posts in the CD. They are Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil and Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Starr of Australia. At the same time I join others in saying goodbye to the Ambassadors who recently left their posts here, Ambassador Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia. I would like to wish all of them every success in their new endeavours.

With the end of the cold war, the world is entering a new historical period of great transformation. The tendency towards a multi-polar world is growing increasingly evident. The overall international situation is heading towards relaxation, with development issues increasingly featured. However, the world today remains a restless place marked by local and regional turbulence and even non-stop wars and conflicts. The North-South gap continues to widen, and contradictions are deepening. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. It follows that the safeguarding of world peace and the promotion of economic development are still serious challenges facing the international community. In this unfolding and volatile international situation China has steadfastly adhered to the fundamental line of opening to the outside world and modernization and gained significant achievements. The Government of China has consistently pursued its independent foreign policy of peace. Relations of friendly cooperation between our country and the other countries in the world have expanded further, and this has played a positive role in the safeguarding of world peace and the promotion of economic development.

The world today is complex and diverse. Countries differ from each other in social system, ideology, culture and tradition, national characteristics, religious belief, etc. Recognition of this diversity and difference of the modern-day world is the premise for the development of international relations. The Chinese Government has repeatedly called for the establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and rational new international economic and political order based on the purposes of the United Nations Charter and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Under this new international order mutual respect among States and their equal sovereignty will replace power politics. Peaceful negotiation and dialogue will replace the use or threat of use of force. Mutual benefit and

(Mr. Hou, China)

cooperation will replace plunder and exploitation. Only in this way can countries live together in peace, harmony and joint development. The Chinese Government will, as always, spare no efforts in working together with all the countries of the world for this new world order and for the promotion of lasting world peace and joint development.

Now I would like once again to outline China's principled standpoints and propositions on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament, the nuclear test ban and security assurances.

During the first half of this century mankind suffered from the scourge of two world wars. In the half-century since nuclear weapons came into existence, mankind has been living under the phantom of a possible nuclear war. That is why early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons has become a fundamental objective of mankind. The halting of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war is thus a priority item on the agenda of the CD.

In recent years the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a number of meaningful agreements on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, which we welcome. At the same time, one also notes that even when all these agreements are fully implemented the fact remains that the two countries still possess the biggest and the most sophisticated and advanced nuclear arsenals in the world. Therefore, as stated in the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions and documents, these countries should continue to undertake and fulfil their special responsibilities for complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

China has never shirked its responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament. It has always stood for the fundamental objectives of early realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has made untiring efforts and important contributions in this regard. It is known to all that since the first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Government has solemnly declared to the world its unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. China has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has on many occasions strongly appealed to other nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar commitments and to conclude as early as possible an international convention to this end.

In order to promote the process of nuclear disarmament and realize the goal of preventing nuclear war, the Chinese Government has recently taken further new initiatives. On 23 December last the Chinese Government formally proposed to the United States, the Russian Federation and other nuclear-weapon States that negotiations should be started among the five nuclear-weapon States with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons. At the beginning of March the Chinese Government once again urged the other four

(Mr. Hou, China)

nuclear-weapon States to respond positively to this proposal and once again invited them to send their delegations to Beijing for negotiations. It is the view of the Chinese Government that in the present international situation the conditions are right for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate and conclude such an international treaty. China believes that the conclusion of this treaty will significantly reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and provide security for the five nuclear-weapon States, especially the small- and medium-sized ones among them. It would also improve mutual trust and contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Finally, it will have an important role to play in realizing a comprehensive nuclear test ban and promoting nuclear disarmament. China is of the view that the questions of refraining from the first use of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban are closely interrelated. It sincerely hopes that the countries concerned will give a positive response to China's initiative and start early negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty against the first use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. China also hopes that the five States will join together to promote vigorously the negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones, so as to make a decisive contribution to freeing mankind from the threat of a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to and actively participates in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. We have noted with pleasure that under the able guidance of the Chairman, Ambassador Guillaume of Belgium, the Ad Hoc Committee has quickly and smoothly proceeded to its work this year. It is our hope that the Committee will achieve substantive progress this year, which will be favourable to the CTBT negotiations and to the smooth convening of the NPT review conference.

As early as 16 years ago the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament correctly pointed out that "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind". Thereafter, this proposition was reaffirmed in the resolutions of successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. China has always actively supported this proposition. China has consistently pursued the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and stood for the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests within this framework. Proceeding from this fundamental position, China has always exercised maximum restraint in its nuclear testing. China's nuclear tests are few and far between, with the lowest number of tests among all nuclear Powers. China fully understands the sincere wish of vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon States for the early conclusion of a CTBT in the belief that such a treaty will contribute to the realization of the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In view of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chinese Government issued a statement

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on 5 October last year reiterating its relevant principled positions and propositions. The statement emphasized that China supports the early conclusion of a CTBT and that it would join the other countries in this negotiation in an effort to conclude such a treaty no later than 1996. China joined the consensus on a resolution on the issue of a CTBT adopted by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. At present, following my Government's instructions, the Chinese delegation is actively participating in the negotiation with a businesslike and responsible attitude in order to make its contribution to the conclusion of an effectively verifiable CTBT which will be able to attract universal adherence.

It is gratifying to the Chinese delegation that at the outset of this year's session the Conference on Disarmament, under the presidency of Ambassador Errera of France, quickly set up an historically significant Ad Hoc Committee on the nuclear-test-ban issue, smoothly adopted a sound mandate and unanimously elected the very experienced Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as its Chairman. Now that the Ad Hoc Committee has started its work, we are confident that under the leadership of its skilful Chairman and the guidance of the chairmen of two working groups, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany and Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, the Committee will live up to the expectations of all sides in making substantive progress in the negotiation of a CTBT.

There are many complex issues before the NTB Committee. Now I would like to make some preliminary comments on the negotiation process. First, China fully supports the Ad Hoc Committee in vigorously negotiating a truly universal and effectively verifiable CTBT in accordance with its mandate. The purpose of such a treaty should be, as specified in the mandate, to "contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security". Second, in view of the importance and universality of the future CTBT, the negotiations on a CTBT and the provisions thereof should fully reflect the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and the generally recognized norms of international relations. There is also the need to ensure the sovereign equality of States and a balance between rights and obligations. Third, we are of the view that the key provisions on the basic obligations and the scope of prohibition of the CTBT must conform fully with the fundamental purposes of the CTBT. To this end strict, precise and clear-cut texts should be worked out on the basis of sufficient and in-depth discussions and negotiations. There should be no loopholes or ambiguities which will give rise to different interpretations, misunderstandings or disputes in the future. Therefore, instead of copying the text of some agreements of the 1960s and 1970s, we should arrive at definitions and provisions truly in conformity with the purposes of the CTBT in the light of today's reality and possible future situations. For example, the CTBT should not become another partial test ban or a merely restrictive treaty. Rather, it should prohibit at any place and in any environment any nuclear-weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy.

(Mr. Hou, China)

Fourth, the proper solution of the verification problem is another complex and difficult task in the CTBT negotiations. We are of the view that verification is closely linked to the provisions on the scope of prohibition and the basic obligations and therefore should be worked out after the settlement of the issues related to definitions. We believe that the verification clauses and arrangements should be strict, effective, fair and reasonable, and should reflect the basic principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the verification of disarmament and arms control agreements. While States parties to the treaty should abide by the treaty and honour their obligations to accept fair verification, they are also entitled to share verification-related information and relevant resources and technology. Abuse of verification leading to unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of States parties and infringements of their security must be prevented.

Fifth, it is our view that seeking an appropriate solution to the issue of security assurances to States parties is to be one of the tasks in the CTBT negotiations. The CTBT is an international legal instrument with a direct bearing on the paramount security interests of States parties. As correctly provided for in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the CTBT should promote the process of nuclear disarmament and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. For this purpose the treaty should contain provision for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties which do not possess nuclear weapons. At the same time it should also provide for States parties with nuclear weapons to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We are deeply convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States enter into the above-mentioned obligations it will add to the substance of the CTBT, further the treaty's universality and constitute a major contribution to international peace and security.

Sixth, like many other delegations we have to stress that the Ad Hoc Committee must also resolve the extremely important and complex issue of entry into force of the CTBT. It goes without saying that the article on EIF must be brought into line with the principles of universality and the main purposes of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament. The CD must also seek a speedy and appropriate solution to the important issue of its expansion, because this is not only related to the strengthening of the CD's role in international political and security affairs but also intertwined with the CTBT negotiations and the smooth resolution of the EIF issues. There should be no more excuses whatsoever to keep a large number of non-member States outside the CD and exclude them from taking part in the CTBT negotiations. We welcome the appointment of Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair on the question of expansion of the CD membership and hope that the positive efforts made by him and the President of the CD will be crowned with success. We also thank Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, for his important contribution. Members of the international community are anxiously

(Mr. Hou, China)

waiting for a successful solution of this problem, and we can no longer let them down.

Finally, I am instructed to take up another issue here. Recently the Chinese delegation noticed that document CD/NTB/WG.2/11 submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands was distributed in the Working Group on Legal and Institutional Issues of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. That document went so far as to list Taiwan, which is an integral part of the territory of China, as a country among the countries with operational nuclear power reactors. It is known to all that there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a province of China. The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate Government representing the whole of China, and enjoys the recognition of the United Nations and the international community, including all the countries which have established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese delegation is hereby authorized to reject categorically the listing of Taiwan as a country in document CD/NTB/WG.2/11 of the delegation of the Netherlands. We resolutely oppose attempts by anybody or any country to create a concept of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". Upon instructions from my Government, I hereby formally request through you, Sir, that the Conference on Disarmament and its NTB Ad Hoc Committee should immediately take the necessary remedial measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement, of which due note was taken, and I also thank him for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Bisley.

Mr. BISLEY (New Zealand): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency. My delegation looks forward to close cooperation with you, and we regard it as a heavy augury that in the first statement that we make under your presidency, we should address the question of transparency in armaments, an area in respect of which you have assumed special responsibilities.

Proposals to control or restrain conventional weaponry have been before the United Nations since 1950, and with the League of Nations even before that. For many reasons, most have not succeeded, and our few successes have been very modest. But times have changed: as the United Nations Secretary-General noted in his paper "New dimensions in arms regulation and disarmament ...", we have a new opportunity to revitalize our efforts in the field of conventional arms. An important aspect of that effort will be the contribution made by this Conference and by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. New Zealand was among those who co-sponsored resolution 46/36 L which established the United Nations Register. The New Zealand Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control welcomed the establishment of the Register as an important step towards addressing the problem of excessive arms transfers.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

New Zealand is a firm supporter of the United Nations Register. We participated fully in 1993, and will do so again this year. Our general objective is to produce the greatest level of transparency possible when providing our national return under the United Nations Register. Furthermore, we are in favour of strengthening and expanding the Register; we intend to make a contribution on this subject to the United Nations Secretary-General in April this year, as requested by resolution 46/36 L. We hope that other Member States will do the same. In preparing that submission, my delegation would commend to others the advantages of including defence officials at an early date. The involvement of defence officials in transparency exercises - which are very new concepts for many countries - is essential to the success of transparency in armaments in general and to the United Nations Register in particular.

I would like to turn to the work of the Conference in the area of transparency in armaments. As you know, the panel of experts established to review the functioning and expansion of the United Nations Register has been tasked to take into consideration the work of the Conference on Disarmament. That is a mandate which my delegation interprets broadly, and which we believe allows the Conference to develop a view on the future of the United Nations Register itself.

The United Nations Register has made an encouraging start, especially in terms of the sheer volume of transfers covered and by securing the participation of the largest arms producers. It has revealed a number of transfers not previously known to the international community; has also provided more up-to-date information on the actual timing of weapons delivered in a number of cases; and has provided an important source of officially endorsed information on arms transfers. The most serious weakness facing the Register at present is the limited extent of participation by Member States in its first year of operation. The level of participation achieved was around what most realistic commentators expected, but it fell well short of the 150 States who voted in favour of resolution 46/36 L.

The first priority of the Register must be to secure universal adherence for four reasons. First, to ensure that those States who are presently participating continue to do so. The Register relies on reciprocity in order to build mutual confidence; if some important States remain outside the regime. those already involved may be put at a disadvantage, and they will have a reduced incentive to remain. Secondly, we also need to encourage wider adherence so that the Register will cover more fully those parts of the world where it is most needed. The Middle East, Africa and East Asia were underrepresented among the 1993 returns. Thirdly, because if the Register is to expand into holdings and national production, the measure of its success will not just be the volume of transfers or the involvement of the major arms producers. The measure of success for an expanded Register will be participation by States who face internal, regional or bilateral security problems, and the degree to which they feel that the Register enhances their security. Finally, we need to secure universal adherence in order

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

to make hay while the sun shines. Wide adherence will be easier to secure now when the obligations of the Register are fewer and the international environment less threatening in some important senses than it has been for many decades.

Turning to the subject of future development, I would like to comment on some desirable changes to the present Register. The early expansion of the Register to include military holdings and national production, foreseen in resolution 46/36 L, is highly desirable. By including these areas we will have removed the legitimate concern that the Register discriminates against importers of conventional arms. A further (technical) reason for widening the scope of the Register is to provide for a more complete assessment of a State's military capability. Keeping in mind that one of the key objectives of the Register is to give a fuller picture of a State's overall military capability, this cannot be done with annual snapshots of transfers; the addition of holdings and production is needed to provide for a more rounded picture of aggregate conventional military capability. A useful addition in this context, perhaps as background information to the Register or as a stand-alone CBM, would be annual declarations on the size and structure of one's armed forces, as suggested already by the United Kingdom in WP.5.

New Zealand was therefore interested in the proposals made last year by the United States and France on the expansion of the Register to include military holdings and national production; I refer to WP.4 and WP.9. With respect to the detail of those proposals, my delegation offers the following comments. For reasons of consistency and administrative ease, we agree that the categories adopted for holdings and production should be the same as those used for transfers; that they should be reported to the same level of detail as the categories for transfers; and on the same annual date. In terms of definitions, we would prefer a more comprehensive approach in order to give a better picture of a State's overall capabilities, and so as to avoid leaving gaps which would effectively omit some equipment. Debate has often centred around what should be included when defining "armed forces" or "procurement through national production". Another way to look at this issue is to say that "everything is in unless ruled out". For example, armed forces should include any organization under the State which controls weapons defined by the Register, including coastguards, interior ministry or security forces, and reservists. Military holdings should include all conventional arms specified by the Register and under the control of the State concerned, including that which is mothballed and that which is awaiting export. But we would exclude equipment under development or research, and that which is placed in historical collection, since the quantities involved in those areas would not likely be significant in quantitative terms. As for national production, we prefer the definition provided by France in WP.8, that is, "all conventional equipment as defined for the purposes of the Register, allocated to the armed forces during the period under consideration from national production, including cooperative production". We would advocate this definition on the basis that it would more comprehensively cover equipment as soon as it leaves the factory, rather than waiting for entry into operational service. We

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

also believe it important to take greater account, as this definition does, of co-production arrangements.

In the full statement distributed to delegations I have made a number of further suggestions regarding ways to develop and expand the Register, including on the transfer of high technology with military application, weapons of mass destruction and the reporting format. For the sake of brevity, I shall not read all those sections now. No doubt there is more that could be added on these topics. But we are conscious of the fact, as I noted earlier, that encouraging wider adherence to the Register should be our first priority. On that basis, I believe we should temper our desire for expansion to ensure that we do not move too fast or too far for all Member States. The need for simplicity and stability, and for a measured approach to the expansion of the Register, especially in its early stages of development, should be borne in mind. That would be a great advantage in encouraging wide, full and accurate participation.

In conclusion, the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important achievement in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Register has provided the international community with an important tool with which to begin addressing the problem of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weaponry. It has also established a new, if still weak, international norm relating to the need for transparency in arms transfers as a means of building confidence between States. Furthermore, the Register is the first fruit of a "new dimension" in international security and arms control. But the international community will need to test continually the underlying logic of the Register and hence the logic which drives the debate on transparency in armaments in this Conference: how much transparency can States actually tolerate, and how soon can they do it? We will need to be very conscious of the fact that more transparency does not necessarily equal more security. This is an area where the Conference on Disarmament has a particular role: the Register does not stand alone, but as part of a wider effort. There are important linkages to be made in this respect to issues of high technology with military application and weapons of mass destruction. Those wider efforts must operate at many levels, including national and regional. The Register represents only one dimension of this effort; the other facets must not be neglected.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Bisley for his statement devoted to questions of transparency in armaments and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): Mr. President, first I want to congratulate you upon the assumption of your presidency, which will last also over the recess of the Conference. I can promise you the full cooperation of the Swedish delegation. I also want to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, for the eminent work he has done during his presidency.

(Mr. Bisley, New Zealand)

I have asked for the floor today to express for the record the great satisfaction of the Swedish Government at the decision of the United States to prolong its moratorium on nuclear testing through September 1995. In the Swedish view that decision, which was very timely, will have a positive effect on the ongoing negotiations here in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is our hope that France and Russia will also extend their moratoria and that China will undertake no new nuclear tests. My delegation is convinced that a total absence of tests during the negotiating period would influence the negotiations in a very positive way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the congratulations he extended to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. I should like to ask if any other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage. I recognize the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. GEVERS (Netherlands): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency. I can assure you of my delegation's full support and confidence that you will guide our work in an excellent manner. I would also like to take this occasion to thank the previous President, Ambassador Hoffmann, for his performance and for his help in all the work of this Conference.

I am taking the floor today to briefly refer to an earlier statement by the representative of the People's Republic of China. The distinguished representative of the People's Republic of China has made a brief reference to a Working Group paper distributed by my delegation some time ago in order to provide information on the issue of the entry into force of a future CTBT. I would like to state that the listings and the names which featured in the Netherlands paper were based on lists, titles and names as released in documents of IAEA in Vienna. My delegation regrets if the Netherlands paper gave rise to confusion. The paper was meant to be of assistance. It had no political connotations. My delegation will, of course, be open to any improvements in the paper which the Conference sees fit.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Gevers, for your explanatory statement and for your kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there other delegations asking for the floor?

If this is not the case, may I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. I should like to add one proposal to this informal timetable, namely concerning the time of the next Presidential consultations. Usually, we have Presidential consultations each Wednesday at 3.30 p.m. Now, I would suggest exceptionally that all those who participate in this Presidential meeting come at 4 p.m. because I have to attend another meeting

(Mr. Gevers, Netherlands)

before, and I wish to be there on time. If there is no objection to this proposal, then I would convene the next Presidential meeting for Wednesday, 30 March 1994 at 4 p.m. in the CD secretariat conference room. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal timetable. Since I see no objection, I consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? This not being the case, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. We still have some time until 1 o'clock and I have been requested by the Chairman of the NTB Working Group I to have a meeting now, so I would propose that the remaining time be used for a meeting of Working Group I under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann. Do the participants agree? If so, I adjourn the plenary meeting and I request Ambassador Hoffmann to take the Chair. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 31 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

CD/PV.677
31 March 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 March 1994 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gyorgy Boytha (Hungary)

GE.94-60981 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 677th and last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament during the first part of our annual session.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Canada, Algeria and the United States of America. I give the floor to the representative of the Czech Republic, Mr. Venera.

Mr. VENERA (Czech Republic): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to take the floor under the presidency of a representative of a country with which we are so closely connected and a personal friend of mine - Ambassador Boytha. May I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Hoffmann, and welcome Secretary-General of the Conference Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, as well as his deputy Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, who share with us their experience and offer us valuable support?

Events of the past years have been persistently demonstrating to us that the world was overmilitarized and overarmed. The participants to the conflicts in the Balkans, in the former Soviet Union and in other parts of the world had too easy access to weapons, including weapons of high destructive power. This unique multilateral negotiating body was therefore rightly applauded when it finally started to react to the urgent need for arms control and disarmament. The conclusion of negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention was its great achievement, and one has to hope that the stockpiles of chemical weapons are put under tight control and destroyed so that no risk appears that they fall into the hands of those involved in regional and ethnic conflicts.

It is encouraging that the Conference has now embarked on serious negotiation of the CTBT. In view of the approaching NPT review and extension conference it is indeed high time to address this long overdue issue expeditiously. Let us hope that a year from now we will have an outline of the draft treaty sufficiently advanced so that it could contribute to the adoption of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely.

The first session of the CD this year has indicated a clear preference for a comprehensive test ban with no low-yield or so-called peaceful nuclear explosions authorized. Serious doubts were voiced with regard to the idea of monitoring preparatory activities. My delegation subscribes to both the need for a comprehensive nature of the CTBT and a realistic approach to what can be banned and verified. Pre-test activities may best be covered within the framework of the NPT, through the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards or, perhaps, through a set of confidence-building measures which may be agreed in future.

As was the case in negotiating the chemical weapons Convention, verification provisions will probably take most of our time and energy. We should not hesitate to draw on the experience gained in developing verification provisions of the CWC. However, we should not do it automatically, since besides

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

similarities there are also substantial differences between the two subject-matters. While the CWC relies heavily on routine inspections and data reporting, the future CTBT will hardly require any extensive routine inspection activities. In the case of challenge on-site inspections the nature of suspected activities will be completely different, though some procedural aspects of the activities of inspectors in the receiving country may be identical irrespective of whether an inspector visits a chemical industry facility or a site where a clandestine nuclear explosion may have occurred.

Perhaps we should constantly keep in mind that in the case of the CTBT we should aim at a cheaper international treaty than was the case for the CWC. The scope of verified activities should be much narrower and the organization for the implementation of the CTBT should thus be smaller in size and budget. Its secretariat may benefit from drawing on the relevant experience and expertise of IAEA, which may prevent the costs of its activities from growing too high.

At the same time we can hardly conceive of such an organization acting without an executive body. It must have an operational ability to review requests for on-site inspections, to assure smooth conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to address treaty compliance questions raised by parties to the treaty. The organization should also be in a position to act independently and be responsible not only for data collection and data exchange but also for data interpretation. This could assure full access of the States parties to the relevant information. At the same time transparency and openness of the organization's activities should make it possible for any State to apply its own processing to the raw data if it is willing to do so. Such a modus operandi will contribute to prompt carrying out of on-site inspections in situations which seem justifiably suspicious.

No delegation seems to question that seismic monitoring should represent the core of the future verification system. As the negotiating process unrolls, views may differ on what other monitoring techniques may be required and to what extent. It is our view that we should make recourse only to such additional measures which may reasonably increase confidence with the treaty. Some of the techniques mentioned so far may seem intellectually exciting, if not exotic. But we should undertake an in-depth analysis of individual measures in order to determine whether their application may be useful for the detection of a clandestine nuclear explosion and be cost-effective. Moreover, it would be wasteful if we chose not to benefit from what national technical means may contribute to compliance with the CTBT. Commercially available satellite imagery could be used rather than, for instance, permanent Earth monitoring exclusively for CTBT verification. If exchange of data stemming from other than seismic monitoring is agreed, it would facilitate the activities of the organization if all data are collected, processed and distributed through a single data exchange system.

(Mr. Venera, Czech Republic)

Entry into force is another issue where we should strike the right balance between the need to assure the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States and the threshold countries and the creation of favourable conditions for the treaty's early entry into force without institutionalizing a sort of veto right of any country. We support those who expressed the view that the required minimum number of ratifications should be lower than in the case of the CWC.

Czech experts have been actively participating in the Group of Scientific Experts since the beginning of its work. We are prepared to participate also in GSETT-3, and we shall provide the seismic station and the national data centre which participated in GSETT-2. We support the carrying out of GSETT-3 as originally planned. It should not, however, fail to contribute directly to the negotiating process aimed at the early establishment of the international seismic monitoring system for the CTBT.

My delegation cannot fail to appreciate the moratorium on nuclear testing observed by the four nuclear-weapon States. The recent decision by President Clinton to prolong the moratorium on testing through September 1995 was an encouraging step in the right direction. We would also like to appreciate the valuable workshop on CTBT verification organized by Japan in mid-March.

Non-nuclear-weapon States are justifiably seeking security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The CD has been discussing this question for years without, to put it mildly, too much imagination. As a non-nuclear-weapon State the Czech Republic would welcome if some progress on this issue could be achieved before the NPT review and extension conference. It is noteworthy that the present political realities in the former Soviet Union posed the problem of security guarantees very seriously. Besides assistance in the destruction process security guarantees are required so that States with nuclear weapons on their territory, belonging to no other State, could soon join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope this process is soon going to be accomplished and we also welcome the recent trilateral statement by the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and the United States. The former Soviet republics certainly represent a particular case. However, good political will and readiness to compromise may, hopefully, inspire also discussions on negative security assurances within the CD.

In the past days the Czech Republic completed its data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Even if more countries could have participated in submitting data to the Register last year we still find it encouraging that a relatively large number of countries chose to participate in this first exchange and we are looking forward to increased participation this year.

The world has undergone tremendous political changes in the course of the last years. The Warsaw Treaty Organization has been abolished and existing international organizations are changing or, like CSCE, accelerating their institutional development and broadening their scope of activity. The

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United Nations membership is approaching 200 and the Organization is involved in an unprecedented number of operations in support of international peace and security. The Conference on Disarmament, however, still seems to prefer to keep its composition based on ideological cliches of the past. A number of new countries have emerged in East and Central Europe. The worst thing the CD can do is to deny them full participation in what we usually describe as a unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body. There are a number of other countries with excellent expertise in disarmament negotiations which have been applying for CD membership for years.

Treaties with limited participation in the security field belong to the past. The chemical weapons Convention, the future CTBT, not to speak of the NPT, can play their role fully only if their membership is evolving towards universality. States will be more prepared to join international treaties which they had a chance to negotiate directly. The CD, in view of its responsibility in disarmament and security, should not permanently ignore this fact. We are looking forward to a solution which would allow all those interested and prepared to contribute, to join the Conference already this year. Continued efforts to pick up a few among those who have applied for membership so far may complicate unnecessarily the decision on the first extension of the CD in 16 years. Let me, in conclusion, wish good luck to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil in his efforts to resolve this problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Czech Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and myself. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, as it is for the first time that my delegation takes the floor during your Presidency, I would like to congratulate you on the assumption of these important functions. We are sure that under your guidance the Conference will succeed in furthering achievements already attained while this body was presided by Ambassadors Errera of France and Hoffmann of Germany.

I should confess that this year the delegation of Ukraine has started its work at the Conference on Disarmament with a considerable amount of optimism, being motivated by the desire to add to the positive momentum in its activities created by the decisions taken at the end of the 1993 session of the Conference and the relevant resolutions of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. These hopes have been justified to a considerable extent.

First and foremost, we note with satisfaction that participants in the negotiations on a nuclear test ban have made very significant steps towards their ultimate goal of elaborating a comprehensive, truly universal and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. Useful discussions on this issue - the key to the Conference on Disarmament's current work - have been taking place at plenary

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meetings, and especially at the sessions of the timely established and efficiently steered working organs of the Conference: the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and both of its working groups. In our view, they have created a milieu favourable for reaching agreement on a number of principal structural elements of the future NTBT without undue delay. We are of the opinion that steady progress in the NTB negotiations would be contributing to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and - equally - to successful preparations for the NPT Review Conference.

Apart from the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it is the issue of security guarantees to the non-nuclear States that bears special significance in this respect. The interrelation existing between these problems is extremely actual for Ukraine as a country in the process of ridding itself of its nuclear "heritage".

Thus, we consider the trilateral statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia, as well as the Joint Statement on Development of United States-Ukrainian Friendship and Partnership of 4 March 1994 - jointly distributed by the parties concerned as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament - to be positive steps not only contributing to reaching a common understanding on matters pertaining to nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, but also providing an important input into the process of deliberations on security assurances within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and in more general context.

Ukraine advocates the idea of a comprehensive approach to this problem. It can be implemented only provided our requirements concerning security assurances to non-nuclear States are met in full measure, taking into consideration the specific character of our country's current situation.

We would certainly welcome a joint declaration or any other legally binding document, worked out by the nuclear States. At the same time we feel that such a document could be followed - eventually - by a broader international instrument in the form of an agreement or convention: the necessity of its conclusion has been already voiced by a number of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament. We think that the creation of such an instrument would substantially enhance the NPT's acquiring the status of a truly universal instrument.

Taking the floor at the last plenary meeting of this part of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament, our delegation cannot but refer again to the issue of the Conference's membership expansion. I do it with a certain regret because, in our assessment, now the Conference stands further from its resolution compared to the initial period of its work in 1994. The corresponding resolution of the United Nations General Assembly has seemingly laid a solid foundation for finding an early positive solution to this problem by setting the date and even allocating additional funds to the Conference on the presumption of its increased membership. The Conference has witnessed a number of significant

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

developments since 25 January; the only area where there is no progress in sight is the issue of its expansion.

Being fully aware of the high sensitivity and complexity of this problem, we deem it necessary to join a number of those in this hall who have on previous occasions warned the Conference that further tardiness could jeopardize the impressive progress achieved by its members on other items of its agenda. It is especially evident in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee, where negotiations have entered the phase when active involvement of the delegations of non-member States is of critical importance. It is equally clear that our delegation, as many others, cannot participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups to the full extent and on a regular basis without adequate experts' backing and other resources which can be provided only on the basis of our Government's decision directly dependent upon the regularization of Ukraine's status within the Conference.

I would like to conclude my statement today by expressing our hope that the appointment of Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil as a Friend of the Chair would facilitate finding a long-awaited solution to the problem of expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament already at the beginning of the second part of its 1994 session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Shannon of Canada, who will speak in his capacity as Special Coordinator on "cut-off", and will present, in accordance with the Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work of the 1994 session of the Conference, a progress report on the consultations he has held so far on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Allow me, Sir, to also express my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency and to indicate to you that I and my delegation will give you our full cooperation and will assist you in carrying out your responsibilities.

As required by my mandate as Special Coordinator of the initiative to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, I am pleased today to report on the progress of my consultations to date. You will recall that I was asked to seek views on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of such material for weapons purposes.

I have consulted a substantial number of delegations on a bilateral basis as well as all groups, including observers. I am grateful to those delegations who

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have expressed views. I intend to continue consultations during the inter-sessional period following the conclusion of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in the next part of the Conference.

I am reporting today on matters on which there appears to be a growing convergence of views as well as on those areas where further consultations clearly will be necessary. I will also suggest next steps which the Conference may wish to take.

My consultations indicate that a preponderant majority view exists among delegations that the Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate international forum to negotiate such a treaty. I hope that this soon will be a unanimous view but that is not now the case. Accordingly the balance of my report should be read with that caveat in mind.

There are a substantial number of States which believe that the process of negotiation of a cut-off treaty could be at least launched while we negotiate a comprehensive teat-ban treaty. This could be achieved through the establishment, at the appropriate time, of an ad hoc committee of the CD in accordance with its usual procedures. Following the lines of the Presidential statement of 25 January, this work might fit most appropriately under agenda item 2. Obviously, it would be part of the function of such an ad hoc committee, as its first priority, to decide on its programme of work and to do so in a manner that would take into account the overall workload of the CD in other ad hoc committees.

My consultations showed that there is a clear need for the Conference to increase its technical knowledge base in order properly to address the issues involved in a subject as complex as cut-off. An ad hoc committee, if it is established, would need to consider at an early stage how to approach this matter. The United Nations General Assembly resolution (48/75 L) which addressed this issue last December specifically contemplated drawing on the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the examination of verification arrangements, as and when required; and rule 41 of the Conference similarly makes specific mention of the role of IAEA in the work of the CD. Consequently, it will be advisable early on to decide how the CD wishes to use the expertise of IAEA.

In this regard, a variety of alternatives are available. An ad hoc committee could decide to simply ask IAEA to construct a verification package as some delegations have suggested. Alternatively, such a committee could decide to establish an experts group on verification based in Geneva, meeting as a working group of the committee. In that form, it could receive submissions of national experts, and experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international organizations as and when required. The committee could then decide to frame three or four verification scenarios to which it could request the working group to respond.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

A further alternative would see at an early stage an ad hoc committee deciding to create a separate group of national and international experts, reporting to the CD ad hoc committee but maintaining close links with IAEA and meeting either in Geneva or in Vienna. Some elements of the GSE model might be useful in constituting such a group. Again, the committee could frame questions for response by such a group within a time-frame to be decided by the committee.

In either of the latter two cases, most delegations would likely agree that IAEA should be invited to contribute views and participate in a manner to be determined by the ad hoc committee. Obviously, any role of IAEA during negotiations would be quite distinct from any possible function it may have in any permanent verification regime established under a treaty, once concluded.

As to the way ahead, I plan during the latter part of the inter-sessional period (after UNDC) and in the next part to continue my consultations with interested delegations and groups, with a view to determining an appropriate mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on cut-off.

Some delegations also have suggested that a broad discussion of issues raised by and related to the cut-off initiative should precede or be an initial part of the commencement of negotiations. In response to those suggestions, I would be prepared to conduct open-ended plurilateral discussions at the same time as continuing bilateral and group consultations. Prior to beginning negotiations, in consultation with the Conference, it may also prove worthwhile to arrange for expert presentations to be made to interested delegations by national experts or international organizations knowledgeable of cut-off issues.

In considering these approaches, we will need to bear in mind that the point of reference is the United Nations General Assembly resolution, adopted by consensus, which recommends the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

These are some of the avenues I intend to pursue and I intend to keep the Conference informed as progress is made. My hope is, with the full support of delegations, to present a mandate for consideration in the course of the next part.

As I had mentioned I would do upon embarking on these consultations, I sought and received comments from delegations on a number of substantive issues, such as the scope of any agreement, the verification regime and the structure of an eventual cut-off convention. It is not my intention today to enter into any details on these aspects of my consultations - it would obviously be premature. However, I intend to address some of these issues in the context of proposing a mandate for negotiations of a cut-off convention in the CD.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I express again my appreciation for the excellent cooperation of all delegations and look forward to continuing my mandate with the full support of all members of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to thank Ambassador Shannon for his very important statement. We all appreciate his untiring efforts in negotiating this issue and we also appreciate the alternatives he has already drawn up concerning the possible approaches to appropriate arrangements. I wish to thank him also for the kind words he addressed to me.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui, who will speak in his capacity as coordinator of the G-21 on negative security assurances.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria): I have asked for the floor in order to read a declaration on behalf of the G-21. As you know, my delegation has the honour to coordinate the activities of this Group on the matters relating to negative security assurances. This is the text of the declaration on the question of negative security assurances.

"The Group of 21 reiterates its conviction that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lie in a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and a complete elimination of these weapons.

"The present international situation has eroded the traditional arguments for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals and clearly calls for the nuclear-weapon States to engage on an effective process of nuclear disarmament. There is also a need to recognize the right of non-nuclear-weapon States not to be attacked or threatened with these weapons.

"This position, shared by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, is a long-standing one. It dominated the debates for a long time, during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty, during its successive review conferences, during all the previous sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, and during hundreds of multilateral meetings, conferences and symposia devoted to disarmament or security.

"In particular, the 14 years during which functioned the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons have always seen the reconfirmation of this position by the Group of 21.

"Today, the existence of such a right to guarantees is also recognized by nuclear-weapon States. However, not all nuclear-weapon States accept the

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idea of implementing those guarantees in a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding, international instrument based on a common formula.

"That explains why, though there is apparently no objection to the principle within the members of the Conference on Disarmament, its Ad Hoc Committee leads only into minor progress and is still far away from proposing a text of consensus.

"Non-nuclear-weapon States that have engaged themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons should be covered by equal and unconditional guarantees, in a multilateral convention which might be based on following principles:

"(a) the nuclear-weapon States will engage to never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

"(b) Non-nuclear-weapon States should have right to guarantees, contents of which will be negotiated within the Ad Hoc Committee;

"(c) the convention should result from a negotiation between all members of the Conference on Disarmament and should be legally binding;

"(d) the common formula enclosed in the convention should be clear, credible, without any ambiguity, and should respond to the concerns of all the parties, including those related to nuclear proliferation in all its aspects;

"(e) the convention should include clear undertakings of nuclear-weapon States concerning a general and complete nuclear disarmament.

"The Group of 21 considers that the conclusion of such a convention should be an important step towards achieving an effective regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects as well as nuclear disarmament.

"It also takes the view that nuclear-weapon States should continue and carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.

"Negative security assurances are a vital element and an important measure of this process.

"The Group of 21 believes that an international legal instrument on negative security assurances and a CTBT, together with other nuclear arms limitation measures, are essential elements of an effective international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

"Accordingly, delegations of G-21 States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty feel that substantive progress in the

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aforementioned areas, and the advancement of these objectives, will decisively influence the outcome of the 1995 review conference of the NPT.

"These member States also believe that, as a first step, nuclear-weapon States should extend, in a legally binding form, the security assurances granted in some international instruments, that assure some non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

"On the eve of the forthcoming review conference, which will decide on questions of vital importance for the future of the international legal regime of non-proliferation, the Group of 21 calls upon all members of the Conference on Disarmament to give a concrete expression of their political will, by taking measures outlined above, in response to the needs of the time."

Mr. President, we should be very grateful if you would take the appropriate steps to register this declaration as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and to have it distributed to all delegations participating in the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for the statement he made on behalf of the G-21. We have taken note of it and of course it will be distributed as a document of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, allow me to express my congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency, and to pledge my full cooperation and that of my delegation as you carry out your functions. We look forward to working with you and your staff over the next several weeks.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly last 27 September, President Clinton announced a programme to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As part of that effort, the President said that the United States would press for an international agreement that would ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The United Nations General Assembly subsequently adopted by consensus a resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. That resolution, among other things, expressed the conviction of the international community that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning production of fissile material for such purposes would make a significant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, and it called upon all States to demonstrate commitment to the objectives of such a treaty. In January, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, spoke at the

inaugural plenary session for 1994 of the Conference on Disarmament. In his statement, Mr. Holum reiterated the United States commitment to negotiate a global fissile material production cut-off agreement, and emphasized that such an agreement should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. As the first part of the 1994 session comes to a close, I would like to echo Director Holum's statement on the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating forum for the cut-off convention. We support the establishment of an appropriately mandated ad hoc committee to begin the negotiations here in the CD.

Consequently, the United States delegation very much supported the idea of a Special Coordinator to consult on the ways and means to negotiate a cut-off convention. We particularly welcomed Ambassador Shannon's appointment to that position. My delegation has listened with interest to Ambassador Shannon's report and commends him on his careful and systematic approach to his consultations, the thoughtful report he has just given the Conference, and the recommendations he has made for the way ahead.

Regarding the question of interaction between the CD and the expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency, raised in Ambassador Shannon's report, the United States believes that the general framework for a verification article in the treaty should be negotiated in the CD. At the same time, we feel that the CD should request the IAEA Director General to establish a group of national experts to prepare a report to the CD, containing options on and recommendations for the verification aspects of the treaty.

The United States looks forward to continuing discussions in the CD on the way ahead for an international convention. My delegation is committed to advancing the non-proliferation programme introduced by President Clinton last fall. A cut-off convention that would end the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes is a very significant part of that programme.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

This not being the case, may I now turn to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of the annual session, that is from 16 to 20 May 1994? This timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes our business for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary

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meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 May 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.